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DEPARTING FROM THE ROUTINE: Application
of Indian Tribal Law Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act
Katherine C. Pearson*
The choice of law rule seems straightforward. Where the federal
government is the alleged tortfeasor and the accident happens within the
boundaries of the United States, the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")
requires the court to apply "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred."' Thus, when the relevant acts occur in a particular state, that
state's law controls substantive legal issues,2 and when the acts occur within
a United States territory, such as Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands, the
territorial law controls.3 When the tort takes place on tribal lands within the
United States, it follows that the law of the Indian tribe controls the case. As
one court observed, "The logic of this simple syllogism is compelling. "4 At
the time of this writing, however, Indian tribal law has been applied only
once to an FTCA case, and the supporting analysis proves to be surprisingly
complex.5
* Associate Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law, The Pennsylvania State
University. My special appreciation goes to my mother, Louise R. Carroll, who has often provided
excellent advice on revisions, and to my father, The Honorable Earl H. Carroll, United States
District Court for the District of Arizona, who has often entertained me with interesting
hypotheticals-and the suggestion that any articles providing clarification on the law affecting the
hypotheticals should have been written yesterday. I also thank Professors William L. Reynolds,
Leslie M. McRae and Robert M. Ackerman for their helpful comments on early drafts, and Denise
Cordes for her diligent research and editorial assistance.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
2. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1962) (holding that FTCA required
application of state's whole law, including applicable choice of law rules); see also McMillan v.
United States, 112 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Montana law to FTCA defense
regarding "inherently dangerous" activities); Mortise v. United States, 102 F.3d 693, 696 (2d Cir.
1996) (applying New York law to FTCA claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress);
Lozada v. United States, 974 F.2d 986, 987 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying Nebraska law to medical
malpractice claim under FTCA).
3. See Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. United States, 112 F.3d 532, 537 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying
U.S. Virgin Island law); Soto v. United States, 11 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1993) (applying Puerto
Rico law).
4. Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (D.N.M. 1999).
5. In distinguishing between choices of substantive law to be applied under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, I will use "tribal law" and "state law." I recognize that tribal law is frequently
distinguishable from the body of law regarding tribal, federal and state sovereignty concerns, often
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For many years, federal courts have routinely applied state law to
substantive issues under the FTCA,6 rarely mentioning potential applications
of tribal law.7 Nonetheless, in June 1999, in the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico, Judge Martha Visquez ruled that tribal law
would control in a Federal Tort Claims Act case involving allegations of
malpractice at an Indian Health Service hospital, thus increasing the scope of
potential damages.' A few weeks later the case settled, rendering the
distinctive decision unreviewable on appeal.9 The ruling is the latest chapter
in the development of conflict of laws for Indian lands within the United
States, 10 and represents a potentially important departure in the jurisprudence
of federal courts.
referred to as Native American law or American Indian law, or as one author usefully, if ironically,
termed it, "Federal Law About Indians." WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 1 (1998). In this article, I am making a further distinction about "conflicts of law" as
they have been recognized inside and outside the context of Indian law. Thus, I will refer to
"Conflict of Laws," when referring to the group of methodologies or approaches that are usually
taught in Conflict of Laws courses in United States law schools, and will contrast these approaches
with the conflict of laws analysis that is central to federal Indian law.
6. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2671-80 (West Supp. 1999).
7. See, e.g., Primeaux v. United States, 149 F.3d 897, 898-900 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying
South Dakota law to issue of apparent authority in FTCA case for officer employed by Bureau of
Indian Affairs); Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1104 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying South
Dakota law to scope of employment issue in FTCA case where law enforcement officer was
involved in sexual abuse of a minor on the reservation); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v.
United States, 936 F.2d 1320, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (applying Minnesota law to issue of causation
of damages for BIA's failure to prevent property damage on reservation during uprising by Indian
protestors); Seyler v. United States, 832 F.2d 120, 121 (9th Cir. 1987) (addressing correctness of
applying Idaho recreational use statute in FTCA case to accident on Indian reservation roadway);
LaRoche v. United States, 730 F.2d 538, 541 n.5 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying South Dakota law to
issue of whether expert testimony was necessary to prove negligence on the part of Indian Health
Service' dentist).
8. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
9. See Scott Sandlin, Tribal Law Used in Negligence Suit Against the U.S., ALBUQUERQUE
J., Aug. 9, 1999, at Al; Telephone Interview with Madeline Henley, Counsel for Defendant United
States, United States Department of Justice, Torts Branch, Civil Division, Washington, D.C. (Aug.
11, 1999) [hereinafter Henley Interview] (on file with author); Telephone Interview with Randi
McGinn, Counsel for Cheromiah Plaintiffs, Albuquerque, New Mexico (August 10, 1999) (on file
with author).
10, See generally CANBY, supra note 5; CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK (Joseph P. Mazurek et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
DESKBOOK]; FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1983) (1941); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT (1997); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671 (1989); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal
Indian Law: The Hard Trail Decolonizing and Americanizing White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,
1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 (1986). Despite, or perhaps because of, its organization as a casebook for
classroom use, a helpful source for introduction to the specialized area of conflicts of law is
TRIBAL LAW UNDER FTCA
I. BACKGROUND
During four visits over a five-day period in 1995, the emergency room at
Acoma Canoncito Laguna Hospital ("ACL Hospital") in New Mexico,
treated twenty-year old Michael Cheromiah, Jr. for acute respiratory
complaints." By the time of his fourth and final visit to the emergency
room, Cheromiah's condition had deteriorated, resulting in immediate
transfer to a hospital in Albuquerque, where attempts to save his life
following cardiac arrest were unsuccessful. 2  Doctors in Albuquerque
discovered a hole in his heart caused by a bacterial infection, 3 and
Cheromiah died on November 4, 1995.14 In a wrongful death suit against
ACL Hospital, the parents of Cheromiah alleged medical malpractice-
specifically negligent failure to diagnose and treat the bacterial infection. 5
Cheromiah was an enrolled member of the Laguna tribe, 16 one of several
Pueblo tribes in central New Mexico.' 7 ACL Hospital is owned and operated
by Indian Health Service ("IHS"), an agency within the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, and primarily serves members of
three Pueblo tribes, including the Laguna and Acoma tribes.'" While the
parties did not present any evidence or arguments to the court regarding the
"ownership" of the specific piece of property where the hospital was located,
it was undisputed that the federal "government operate[d] ACL Hospital
pursuant to a lease with the Acoma tribe and that the hospital" was within the
boundaries of Acoma's tribal lands.' 9 ACL Hospital is approximately
provided by DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (4th
ed. 1998) [hereinafter GETCHES].





16. The three tribes served by ACL Hospital are the Laguna Pueblo (approximate population
5,500), Canoncito Navajo (approximate population 1,100) and Acoma (approximate population
3,500) tribes. See Indian Health Service, Acoma-Canoncito-Laguna Service Unit, (visited Feb. 14,
2000) <http:/Iwww.ihs.gov/FacilitiesServices/AreaOfficeslAlbuquerque/aclsu.asp> [hereinafter
Indian Health Service]. They are among nineteen Pueblo tribes in New Mexico, each differing
"politically and anthropologically." STEPHEN L. PREVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES
251 (2d ed. 1992) (-Native communities were well established in what is now New Mexico long
before the Spanish conquistadors entered the region during the 1600s. Each community had its own
government, language and culture."); see also JOE S. SANDO, PUEBLO NATIONS: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF PUEBLO INDIAN HISTORY (1992). An interesting and detailed history of the Acoma
Pueblo and the ACL Hospital is provided by WARD ALAN MINGE, ACOMA: PUEBLO IN THE SKY
105-07, 136-37 (2d ed. 1991).
17. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 1297, 1304.
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seventy miles from Albuquerque, the location of the nearest major
hospitals."
Under New Mexico state law, there is a dollar limitation on recoverable
damages in medical malpractice cases. 2' At the time of the incident, the
medical malpractice cap was $600,000 for personal injury and wrongful
death cases in which New Mexico law was applied. ' The United States has
successfully argued that medical malpractice caps under similar state laws
should be applied under the FTCA, even though the federal government does
not participate in any state's statutory mechanism for management of medical
malpractice claims.' In the Cheromiah case, the plaintiffs contended that
under Acoma tribal law, no ceiling existed for damages in any tort case,
citing an Acoma tribal court opinion from 1997.24
During the pretrial process, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary
judgment, seeking a ruling that New Mexico's statutory limitation on
damages in medical malpractice cases did not apply to the case, and arguing
that Acoma tribal law should control.' In a several page Memorandum
Opinion and Order issued on June 29, 1999, Judge Vdsquez ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs on the choice-of-law issue, acknowledging that her ruling was a
20. See Indian Health Service, supra note 16.
21. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1998).
22. See id. In pertinent part, the law provides:
Except for punitive damages and medical care and related benefits, the
aggregate dollar amount recoverable by all persons for or arising from any
injury or death to a patient as a result of malpractice, shall not exceed six
hundred thousand dollars ($600,000) per occurrence. In jury cases, the jury
shall not be given any instructions dealing with this limitation.
§ 41-5-6(A). The $600,000 cap applies to malpractice "occurring on or after April 1, 1995." § 41-
5-6(E). The New Mexico statute also caps individual provider's liability at $200,000, providing
that any excess, up to $600,000, is to be paid from a state patient's compensation fund. See § 41-5-
6(D). In Cheromiah there did not appear to be any attempt by the United States to assert a right to
limitation under the $200,000 figure. See Carter v. United States, 982 F.2d 1141. 1144-45 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that the United States was entitled to benefit from limitation on total damages
under Indiana law, but was not entitled to lesser limit for "qualified health care providers").
23. See Hill v. United States, 81 F.3d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the general
proposition that state caps for tort liability may apply to medical malpractice claims under FTCA);
Lozada v. United States, 974 F.2d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying Nebraska cap on medical
malpractice damages, normally available only to "qualified health care providers" to FTCA claim);
Knowles v. United States, 829 F. Supp. 1147, 1150-52 (D.S.D. 1993) (applying North Dakota
medical malpractice cap to U.S. liability under FTCA), rev'd in part on other grounds, 91 F.3d
1147 (8th Cir. 1996).
24. See Memorandum for Plaintiffs in support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in
Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999), at 24 (on file with author);
Louis v. United States, No. Civ. 97-CV-24, slip op. at 3 (Court of the Pueblo of Acoma, 1997).
25. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1297.
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departure from decisions in other recent cases,26 including another case
within the same district court and involving the same hospital.' On its own
motion, the court certified the choice-of-law issue for interlocutory appeal,
giving the federal government a specific time period to make a decision to
appeal or go forward with the summer trial date.' When post-ruling
arguments failed to change the trial judge's position and the time had lapsed
for giving notice of an interlocutory appeal, the case was settled by the
Department of Justice attorneys for $675,000, thus negating any appeal.29
One factor appearing to affect the United States' decision to settle was the
desire to limit the precedential value of any further ruling in the case.30
Thirty-four states contain Indian reservations or Alaskan Native
populations within their boundaries. 3' The Indian Health Service is the major
provider of health care services to tribes, by its own published estimates
serving approximately 1.5 million American Indians and Alaskan Natives
among "more than 557 federally recognized tribes."32  Its annual
26. See id. at 1305-06; see also Chips v. United States, Civ 92-5025, slip op. at 3 (D.S.D.
Apr. 28, 1993) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss, applying South Dakota state law which
immunized a "good samaritan" from liability for providing roadside emergency medical assistance,
rather than tribal law which did not follow such a policy, but engaging in no detailed analysis of its
choice-of-law rationale); Azure v. United States, CV-90-68-GF-PGH, slip op. at 8-10 (D. Mont.
May 9, 1991) (granting the government's motion to implead an Indian driver as a third-party
defendant for injuries sustained in auto accident, and recognizing the existence of a choice-of-law
issue, but concluding that third-party defendant had failed to overcome the "legion of cases"
applying state law to claims arising on the reservation under the FTCA).
27. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1305-06; see also Louis v. United States, 967 F.
Supp. 456 (D.N.M. 1997).
28. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308-09. "In the interest of judicial economy, the
Court will sua sponte certify this issue for interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)."
Id.
29. See Henley Interview, supra note 9.
30. See Sandlin, supra note 9, at Al ("[T]he Justice Department was clearly dismayed with
the court's decision to use tribal law in the case-a first in the nation.").
31. Two related articles provide a comprehensive review of federal Indian health care policy.
See Rose L. Pfefferbaum et al., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Native Americans: Policy,
Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 211, 217 n. 17 (1997) [hereinafter
Pfefferbaum, Providing for the Health Care Needs] (listing thirty-five states served by IHS:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming); Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning How To Heal: An Analysis of the History,
Policy, and Framework of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365 (1995-96) [hereinafter
Pfefferbaum, Learning How To Heal]; see also Indian Health Service Homepage (last modified
Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.ihs.gov>.
32. Indian Health Service Homepage (last modified Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.ihs.gov>;
see also GETCHES, supra note 10, at 16 (noting that in 1995 the Indian Health Service "served
approximately 70 percent of the total Native American population").
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appropriation exceeds $2 billion.33 As of March 1996, the Indian Health
Service ("IHS") system "consisted of 37 hospitals, 64 health centers, 50
health stations, and five school health centers. "34 Most medical care
provided by IHS is free of charge to the patient.35 Congress has adopted
legislation supporting tribal involvement in health care services and tribes
may in certain instances contract for private health care services using tribal
or federal funds;36 however, Congress has granted the states no general
authority to regulate health care services on Indian lands. 3" Attempts by the
federal government to shift portions of the expense for Indian health care to
the states have produced mixed results.38
II. THE CHEROMIAH CASE RULING: TRIBAL LAW GOVERNS
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal district courts are
provided with "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States" involving personal injury or wrongful death alleged to be
caused "by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee" of
33. See Indian Health Service Fact Sheet (last modified Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.ihs.
gov/AboutIHS/ThisFacts.asp >.
34. Id.
35. See Jennie Joe, The Delivery of Health Care to American Indians: History, Policies and
Prospects, in AMERICAN INDIANS: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 149, 149 (Donald E.
Green & Thomas V. Tonnesen eds., 1991). "Although most reservation-based American Indians
and Alaska Natives have access to free health care services under the federal Indian Health Service
(IHS), these services are limited and what is available may not be appropriate for the health
problems faced by many of the Indian clients." Id. at 150.
36. See Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C. and 25 U.S.C.); Indian Health Care
Improvement Act (IHCIA) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (codified in various sections
of 25 U.S.C.) and amended by the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
573, 106 Stat. 4526; see also Pfefferbaum, Providing for the Health Care Needs, supra note 31, at
229-41 (describing IHS structure, capacity and modes for health service delivery).
Tribes have become increasingly interested and involved in assuming control
over health care programs, but generally lack sufficient capital (human and
physical, as well as financial) to effectively and efficiently assume full
responsibility for the provision of care. Neutral with respect to self-
determination and self-governance, the IHS provides services through tribes as
well as directly through IHS facilities and personnel and through contracts with
other non-IHS providers.
Id. at 216.
37. But see Joe, supra note 35, at 162-64 (describing California's historical role as primary
provider of health care for California tribes); Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Harris, 618 F.2d
569, 573-75 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that IHS has breached its statutory obligation to provide
adequate federal funding for health services to Indians within California state).
38. See Joe, supra note 35, at 167-74 (describing court challenges to primary payor issues in
Indian and indigent health care).
700
32:695] TRIBAL LAW UNDER FTCA
the federal government acting within the scope of his or her employment,
"under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred. 39 In ruling on Cheromiah's motion, the court noted that
"place" as used in the Tort Claims Act means "political entity" and is not
necessarily synonymous with "state."' Thus, United States courts have
applied the substantive law of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam,
the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone to FTCA cases.4 As the
court observed in the Cheromiah case, "None of these entities are states.
Yet, they are the 'political entities' in whose jurisdiction the alleged tort
occurred. "42
The court said that the issue was not simply determining the "law of the
place where the act or omission occurred," but involved analysis under the
immediately preceding clause in Section 1346(b)(1). 43  Thus, the district
court identified the central issue as "whether a private person in like
circumstances could be found liable under Acoma tribal law for the acts of
negligence asserted here." 44 Narrowing the issue, the court restated it as
"could a private entity that is, like the United States, non-Indian, be sued and
be held liable for medical malpractice under Acoma tribal law?" 45
The court acknowledged that where tribal jurisdiction is involved, the
"situation . . . is more complex than with the territories."' Despite the
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (1994).
40. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (D.N.M. 1999).
41. See id. (citing Gelley v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, 610 F.2d 558, 560 (8th Cir.
1979) (applying District of Columbia law); Sea Air Shuttle Corp. v. United States, 1i2 F.3d 532,
537 (1st Cir. 1997) (applying Virgin Islands law); Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1033 (2d Cir.
1995) (applying Guam law); Soto v. United States, 11 F.3d 15, 16, (1st Cir. 1993) (applying Puerto
Rico law); Dean v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 167, 169 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (applying Canal Zone
law)).
42. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). This provision gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district
courts for civil actions against the United States on claims,
for money damages ...for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place were the act or
omission occurred.
Id. (emphasis added).
44. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
45. Id.
46. Id. The related question of whether the reference to "territories," as used by Congress in
adopting the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, includes "tribes" has been answered in
the negative by one commentator. See Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., Problems in Application of Full Faith
and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv. 133, 135-38 (1977); see also Robert Laurence, Full
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existence of decisions recognizing Indian tribes as having sovereign
attributes47 and despite the Supreme Court's recognition of tribal authority
over disputes with non-Indians in several instances,48 the district court noted
that "[m]ore recently . . . the Supreme Court has distanced itself" from
broad declarations of tribal power.49 The district court relied upon two
Supreme Court cases restricting the tribe's exercise of adjudicative and
regulatory authority over non-Indian parties, which when read together
provide the general rule, that "absent a different congressional direction,
Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-
Indian land within a reservation."So More importantly, the district court
identified two exceptions to the Supreme Court's general rule: "The first
exception relates to nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members; the second concerns activity that directly affects the
tribe's political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.""1 The
Supreme Court cautioned that with respect to the second exception, care
should be taken not to assume a "health or welfare" concern, as this could
Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19 (1998). But see Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655
P.2d 895, 901-02 (Idaho 1982). In any event, the Constitutional and statutory command that states
'shall" give full faith and credit to the "Acts" of other states, as viewed by the United States
Supreme Court in recent years, has surprisingly little force. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). Even in the context of state-to-state choice-of-law issues, the Full Faith and
Credit provisions have been viewed as failing to mandate one state's application of another state's
law. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF
LAWS 269-283 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing constitutional and statutory limitations on legislative
jurisdiction in choice-of-law); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 88-103 (2d
ed. 1992) (noting that "the Supreme Court at one time used the Full Faith and Credit Clause
affirmatively to mandate choice of law .... Analysis of the case law shows that this approach has
been largely abandoned"); see also Katherine C. Pearson, Common Law Preclusion, Full Faith and
Credit, and Consent Judgments: The Analytical Challenge, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 419 (Winter
1999).
47. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1302-03 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455
U.S. 130, 138 (1982)); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) and quoting Judge Visquez' own ruling in Kerr-McGee v. Farley,
915 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D.N.M. 1995), aff'd 115 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1997)).
48. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980) (permitting state to impose sales taxes on
cigarettes sold to non-Indians on tribal lands; prohibiting state from imposing excise tax on Indian-
owned autos)); see also Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15-16 (1987) (refusing to
permit non-Indian's diversity suit to go forward in federal court during pendency of related tribal
suit, recognizing need to "exhaust" tribal court remedy); National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (refusing to foreclose tribal court jurisdiction over civil
dispute involving non-Indian defendant, instead announcing "exhaustion" required before any
related federal court may be heard).
49. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
50. Id. (quoting Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 446 (1997) (emphasis added)).
51. Id. (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 446) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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lead to the exception swallowing the general rule.52 For example, in Strate
v. A-1 Contractors,53 the Supreme Court concluded that the tribe could not
exercise jurisdiction over a suit for negligence in the operation of private
vehicles on public highways maintained by the state pursuant to a federally
granted right of way over Indian reservation land, despite the tribe's "health
and welfare concerns" over driver conduct.
5 4
The district court concluded that the Cheromiah case fell within both
exceptions, permitting the exercise of "tribal authority" over the non-tribal
member party, the ACL Hospital.55 On the first exception, the district court
observed that the "United States government has, by virtue of its own
affirmative acts, entered into a lease and contract arrangement to provide
medical and emergency services to the Acoma Tribe," in other words, a
"'consensual relationship' of the qualifying kind." 56  On the second
exception, the court found that the United States' role in operating the
hospital created "one of the unique situations in which the conduct of non-
members ... impacts the 'health or welfare of the tribe,"'57 continuing:
Alleged medical malpractice at the Hospital has a direct and
substantial impact on the health and welfare of the Tribe, more
than would a simple, isolated tort between individuals .... [I]f a
privately run hospital on the reservation failed to provide medical
services at the standard expected of such professionals, it would be
reasonable to hold the owners of the hospital liable in accordance
with the principles of liability found in the law of the Tribe.
58
Thus, the district court concluded that the Cheromiah case fact pattern
satisfied either of the Supreme Court's two exceptions permitting exercise of
tribal authority over non-Indians.59
Having recognized that tribal authority over hospital negligence in a
private suit may be appropriate under Supreme Court standards, the district
court returned to what it viewed as the essential choice-of-law question under
the FTCA. ° After its analysis of the Montana/Strate factors, the district
52. See id. at 1304 (citing Strate, 520 U.S. at 459).
53. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
54. See id. at 454-59.
55. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-05. In doing so, and in the absence of evidence
showing ownership of the land on which the hospital was situated, the court assumed that the
hospital should be treated as a non-tribal party, "some how [sic] subject to less [than full] tribal
authority." Id. at 1304.
56. Id. at 1304 (quoting Strate, 520 U.S. at 457).
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court found it relatively easy to answer the choice-of-law question, turning to
the FTCA's use of the phrase "'circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable' to the claimant" and noting the tie between
this phrase and the choice of law language in the statute. 6' Only if the
"circumstances" were appropriate could the court recognize the Acoma Tribe
as the relevant political entity that controls the place where the alleged tort
occurred. Once the analysis of the "circumstances" was satisfied, the "law
of the place," in this instance the law of the Acoma Tribe, could be applied
properly.62
Judge Vsquez specifically conceded that her ruling was a departure from
the routine. 63 Reviewing recent rulings by other courts, she concluded that,
[1In none of these cases was the application of tribal law ever
raised as an issue. Perhaps this is because the idea did not occur to
the plaintiffs, or perhaps it is because the tort law of the particular
tribe was not well developed. Regardless, all this demonstrates is
that tribal law has never before been applied to an FTCA claim.
But the fact that it has never been done, standing alone, does not
mean that it is not what the law requires. 64
Judge Vdsquez emphasized that Cheromiah's parents needed no case law
precedent for application of tribal law, as the text of the Federal Tort Claims
Act was adequate support-"[t]hey need nothing else." 65
In reaching its conclusion, the court addressed and dismissed several
collateral points, some of which appear important. The court noted a
concern that application of tribal law would lead to unpredictability and lack
of uniformity, with the potential for the law of more than 500 recognized
tribes within the United States borders to be placed at issue.' However,
Judge Vdsquez concluded that since the FTCA already authorized the
application of the substantive law of more than fifty different states and
territories, variances and predictability could not have been a major concern
of Congress in adopting the Act.67 More importantly, the Act "reflects the
long held belief in this nation that liability for tort damages should be judged
61. Id. at 1302 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1) (1994)); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (stating that
the waiver of immunity for torts is restated but the language imposing liability "in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" is unconnected to any
reference to "place").
62. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
63. See id. at 1305-06; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
64. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1307.
67. See id.
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by the standards of the local community in which the harmful act
occurred." 68  Additionally, the court rejected application of the statutory
exception to liability under the FTCA for torts that occur in foreign
countries.69 "While 'Indian tribes and the federal government are dual
sovereigns,' . . . the tribes are not foreign countries under any definition of
the term. "7°
Perhaps most significantly, the district court summarily rejected the
United States' back-up argument that in the absence of a specific statutory
law recognizing a wrongful death claim, such as New Mexico's wrongful
death act,"' the Cheromiah parents had no basis upon which to make any
claim for damages, with or without a cap.72 Commenting that the plaintiffs
would not be allowed to pick and choose among state and tribal laws, thereby
relying on only those most favorable to their claim, the district court
appeared to conclude that Acoma tribal law clearly supplied an equivalent
cause of action to New Mexico's wrongful death statute.73
Finally, the court found that even "assuming the most restrictive scope of
tribal authority over the lands in question," under the circumstances present
in the Cheromiah case, the tribe would still have authority over a non-Indian
entity "standing in the government's shoes." 74 Thus, the court held plainly
"that Acoma tribal law governs this case. "
75
68. Id. (citing Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)).
69. See id. at 1308; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994).
70. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (citing Kerr-McGee v. Farley, 915 F. Supp. 273,
276 (D.N.M. 1996); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962); Oneida Indian
Nation of New York v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1089 (2d Cir. 1982)).
71. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1998).
72. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308; see, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 945 [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON] (noting that the
common law denied tort recovery for injury once a tort victim died, but "[e]very American state
now has a statutory remedy for wrongful death").
73. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
The Court agrees that Plaintiffs may not pick and choose those provisions they
like from New Mexico and Acoma tribal law in pursuing their claims.
However, the United States has failed to establish that Plaintiffs' wrongful
death claim is dependent on the New Mexico statute . . . . Indeed the only
precedent currently before this Court specifically finds that a wrongful death
claim may be pursued under Acoma tribal law.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Buchea v. United States, 154 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1998).
74. Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1308.
75. Id.
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III. CONFLICT OF LAWS METHODOLOGY: THE IMPORTANCE OF
RECOGNIZING TRIBAL LAW
The Cheromiah decision signals the Federal Tort Claims Act as a future
arena for recognition of tribal law as a viable choice in conflicts of law. One
important element of the decision is timing. In recent years, an increasing
number of tribal governments have taken steps to codify tribal law,
particularly in the areas where tribal views differ from the domestic laws of
the states.76 While such movements are often controversial,' I codified law
and the increasing use of written opinions in tribal courts provide lawyers
with key tools necessary to identify and argue conflicts of law before the
federal courts.
Additionally important is the alignment of parties and tort issues, making
the rationale behind application of at least certain elements of state law
appear particularly weak. The Cheromiah case involves Indian plaintiffs,
seeking damages for alleged negligent acts or omissions occurring wholly
within the boundaries of tribal lands. The claims arise out of federal medical
services available only to tribal members; these services involve an area of
substantive tort law, medical malpractice, which has traditionally been
viewed as properly measured by a localized standard of care, although more
76. See, e.g., BRUCE ELLIOTr JOHANSEN, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN
LEGAL TRADITION 340-44 (1998) (tracing the history of tribal courts and legal traditions); Frank
Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts and the Role of the
Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community, 18 N.M. L. REV. 49, 51-56 (1988). Pommersheim
notes:
current tribal codes of most tribes which serve to elucidate the framework of
tribal court activity are a combination of unique tribal law and adapted state
and federal law principles. Apparent in the newer codes is a decided
commitment to develop increased tribal statutory, including customary, law
and an organized and reported body of tribal decisional law.
Id. For more information, contact the Native Indian Law Library, a project of the Native American
Rights Fund (NALF), located in Boulder, Colorado.
77. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN
JUSTICE (1983).
The greatest challenge faced by the modern tribal court system is in the
harmonizing of past Indian customs and traditions with the dictates of
contemporary jurisprudence. Tribes are reluctant to abandon their past
traditions by placing too much reliance on the whites' legal procedures and
practices. While borrowing some Anglo-American notions about the system of
justice, tribal courts are struggling to preserve much of the wisdom of their
past experiences.
Id. at 120; see also Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How
the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 235 (1997) (arguing that adoption of non-Indian norms endangers tribal sovereignty).
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recently it has attracted a nationalized standard.7" The allegations of
negligence in failing to diagnose and treat an emergency medical condition
are quite site-specific, especially as compared to allegations of fault in a
more routine tort claim. For example, as discussed in greater detail below, 79
an Indian victim of the federal government's negligence in failing to patch a
pot-hole at the ACL Hospital parking lot, although clearly entitled to
compensation, seems to present a less compelling reason for application of
tribal rather than state law to the issue of damages.
It also seems significant that the case does not involve an attempt by non-
Indian victims to use tribal law, perhaps to avoid state law that otherwise
might limit their damages. For example, the case does not arise in the
context of a non-Indian injured in an auto accident on tribal lands caused by
the negligent driving of a federal employee. In other words, the Cheromiah
case may be an especially compelling instance for application of tribal law as
the "law of the place" under the FTCA.8"
The decision to apply tribal law under the Federal Tort Claims Act will
undoubtedly attract the attention of Indian law and Indian history scholars. 8'
78. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 72, at 188 (noting movement away from traditional
"locality rule" in favor of nationalized standard of professional medical care).
79. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.c.
80. See Louis v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1209 (D.N.M. 1999).
81. For example, Judge Vdsquez was clearly troubled by the lack of consensus or evidence
regarding "ownership" of the particular lands on which the ACL hospital sat. See Cheromiah v.
United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1304 (D.N.M. 1999). Although not apparent from the
memorandum of the parties submitted to the district court, there appears to be support for a
conclusion that the lands were "owned" by the Pueblo. The legal claims of the Pueblo tribes to
lands within the borders of what is now New Mexico are tied to the history of Spanish claims of
authority.
While the New Mexico Pueblos hold their lands communally, their title is
virtually unique. Most of the Pueblo lands were acquired in fee under Spanish
rule. When New Mexico Territory was acquired by the United States as a
result of the Mexican War, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo . . . (1848),
guaranteed property rights acquired under the Spanish and Mexican
governments . . . .The Pueblos accordingly own most of their lands in fee,
rather than having the United States hold the legal title for them.
CANBY, supra note 5, at 363-64 (citations omitted); see also JOHANSEN supra note 76, at 254-61
(discussing the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act and Pueblo legal traditions); WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED
MAN'S LAND, WHITE MAN'S LAW 139-142 (1995) (describing the "unique" history of Pueblos of
New Mexico); PREVAR, supra note 16, at 253 (describing "unique" ownership status of Pueblo
tribal lands). Thus there are, perhaps, historical reasons to support a conclusion that in the case of
Acoma Pueblo, the land on which the federal hospital was situated, was actually owned by the tribe.
What does this mean, if true? Judge Visquez felt the necessity of undertaking the Montana/Strate
exception analysis was triggered by the possibility that tribe was not the owner of the land. While it
seems likely that some "federal Indian law" analysis will be used whenever the tort occurs within
the broadly defined "Indian country," it is unclear whether precisely the same analysis should be
used in all instances of FTCA claims by Indian plaintiffs. See infra Part III.A.3.
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This article acknowledges the importance of Indian law and history, but
approaches the issues primarily from the perspectives suggested by
mainstream Conflict of Laws analysis.82 In recent discussions of the
complexities posed by tribal, state and federal sovereignty issues, Conflict of
Laws scholars have "largely ignored" Indian law. 83  The issue of applying
tribal law under the FTCA proves to be an excellent opportunity for
attempting to reconcile, or at least, to understand better, the forces which
have shaped these different approaches to essential conflicts.
A. Applying Tribal Law Under the FTCA
1. Defining "Place"
The Federal Tort Claims Act was adopted in 1946, thereby creating a
specific statutory waiver of federal sovereign immunity, and blending an
important public policy goal with practicality:
82. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective
Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235 (1999) (using traditional choice of law
approaches to reexamine Erie doctrine); Lesli Hiller, The "Most Significant Relationship" Test of
the Second Restatement of Conflicts and its Effects Outside the United States in the Area of Torts,
12 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 55 (1999) (using Restatement (Second) as tool to analyze conflicts in private
international law). As the author of this article, I approach the topics of tribal law, federal law
about Indians and Indian history with some trepidation. While practicing law in New Mexico from
1981 to 1995, I learned to respect the enormous complexity and sophistication of questions of law
involving American Indians, and I learned enough to know that I can claim no specialized expertise
in tribal law. I defer to my many colleagues in New Mexico who have far greater expertise in
tribal and Indian law, particularly the scholars at the University of New Mexico School of Law,
with whom I had the pleasure of working while a visiting professor for several semesters in the
school's nationally recognized clinical program. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine P.
Zuni, Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of Indigenous Women in the United States, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 69 (1995).
83. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 46, at 388. In using Conflict of Laws methodology as a
comparative tool, I am influenced by Professor Judith Resnik's observation ten years ago that
'while there is a wealth of scholarship about Indian tribes, that scholarship is not integrated into
federal courts' jurisprudence." Resnik, supra note 10, at 676. The paucity of reported FTCA
cases considering tribal law suggests that this is an area where it is appropriate to consider the
intersection between mainstream theory on Conflict of Laws and the more specialized form of
conflict of laws that is at the heart of "Federal Law About Indians." CANBY, supra note 5, at 1.
Of the most frequently used casebooks on Conflict of Laws, relatively few of them provide
opportunities to consider Indian issues. One casebook providing a short but helpful introduction to
Indian Law as part of the overall curriculum on Conflict of Laws is SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES ET
AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 904-31 (1998); see also
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 46 at 388-94; supra note 5 and text accompanying.
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The broad and just purpose which the statute was designed to effect
was to compensate the victims of negligence in the conduct of
governmental activities in circumstances like unto those in which a
private person would be liable and not to leave just treatment to the
caprice and legislative burden of individual private laws.
84
Prior to the FTCA, Congress had addressed instances of personal injury
caused by federal employees through private legislation, a process described
as at best "notoriously clumsy." 85  When construing the FTCA, the
commentators8 6 and the courts frequently noted the limited nature of the
remedy, emphasizing certain well-known principles of statutory construction
applicable to waivers of sovereign immunity, including: (a) the principle that
only those causes of action clearly within the terms of the statutory grant of
consent to be sued will be recognized; 87 (b) waiver is not to be enlarged by
implication to causes not plainly within its terms; 88 (c) the statute is to be
"strictly construed" in favor of the sovereign; 89 and (d) the plaintiff generally
bears the burden of proving that the government's waiver is applicable.'
Yet despite such conservative admonitions, "the higher the level of the
court construing the Act, the greater the tendency to break away from the
84. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955).
85. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953).
86. See, e.g., LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES (1999); CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3656, 3658 (3d ed. 1998); ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCE BOOK
(1992).
87. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1980) (construing Tucker Act and
Indian Claims Commission Act as providing access to Court of Claims but conferring no
substantive right for tribes to recover damages for mismanagement of trust relationship); United
States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (construing Tucker Act); see also Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (holding that Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302,
was not a general waiver of tribe's sovereign immunity).
88. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996); United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976) (distinguishing several statutory provisions, and noting that "waiver of the traditional
sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed'") (citations omitted).
89. See Lehnman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) (stating that "this court has long
decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be
strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied") (quoting Soriano v. United States,
352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)).
90. See Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a "party
bringing a cause of action against the federal government bears the burden of showing an
unequivocal waiver of immunity"). But see Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir.
1992) (placing burden of proving exception to waiver of sovereign immunity on the United States);
Carlyle v. United States, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1982).
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rigidities and austerities of the traditional view."9' The Supreme Court
observed,
[W]hen dealing with a statute subjecting the Government to liability
for potentially great sums of money, this Court must not promote
profligacy by careless construction. Neither should it as a self-
constituted guardian of the Treasury import immunity back into a
statute designed to limit it.92
The FTCA is a curious blend of specificity and openness. By permitting
different state laws to apply, depending on the coincidence of "place,"
Congress created a system of claims handling which involves a great deal of
potential variation in the scope of damages and in the definitions of key
negligence principles.93 Medical malpractice, for example, may occur at a
military base hospital, and although military members will usually find
themselves prohibited from suing for their own service-connected injuries
because of the Supreme Court's "Feres Doctrine,"' their spouses or children
who are treated in base hospitals may find the scope of potentially
compensable damages far different from state to state. 95  Similarly, the
91. JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 86, at § 3.03 (noting that "at all levels from the
District Court to the Supreme Court, the courts have refused to adopt the traditional conservative
rule, but instead have read the Act in the light of its remedial purpose and have applied a liberal
construction") (footnote omitted).
92. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955); see also Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 203 (1993). One commentary notes that the Supreme Court's recent analysis
"suggests that notions of 'strict' vs. 'liberal' construction should be of little moment in construing
the tort claims act. . . ." JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 86, at § 3.03.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 2671-80 (1994); see also
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 86, at § 9.09.
Thus state-law doctrines of res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, proximate
cause, contributory negligence and assumed risk govern the question of federal
liability. The government's duty as landlord or invitor, and its obligations to
make contribution and indemnity, are likewise determined by state law, except
only so far as the statute as judicially construed may specifically provide
otherwise. Whether a government employee is acting within the scope of his
employment when he commits a tort is also a state law issue, though federal
law governs the question whether the agency committing the tort is a federal
agency at all.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 72, at 1034 (citations omitted).
94. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (holding, in what has become known as
the "Feres Doctrine," that FTCA does not permit tort claims to be made by members of the armed
forces for injuries arising out of activities incident to their service, including claims of medical
malpractice by military medical personnel).
95. As of this writing, twenty-three states have some form of medical malpractice cap on
damage recovery. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-544 (1993); CAL. CIV. CODE § 333.2 (West 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-31-102.5(3)(a) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.209(4) (West 1997); GA.
CODE ANN. § 105.2002.1 (Harrison 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (Michie 1998); KAN.
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scope of liability for damages for the United States differs from state to state.
Congress seemed content, however, with this variation, declining to define a
uniform standard of "negligence" for purposes of compensating personal
injury and wrongful death. Instead Congress adopted specific limitations,
such as a prohibition on punitive damages and prejudgment interest, a bar on
certain types of tort claims, and perhaps trusted the exclusive federal court
forum, acting without a jury, to provide any necessary national consistency.'
Did Congress specifically consider "tribal law" as one option when
enacting the FTCA? Did Congress contemplate "tribal law" as a viable "law
of the place" when making the federal government liable "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred[?]" ''  Review of the legislative history9" suggests the
answer is "no," just as the answer was "no" when the question was whether
Congress contemplated reference to a state's "whole law" when using the
same phrase. 99 Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court noted almost forty-five
STAT. ANN. § 40-3403(e) (1993) before July, 1989, § 40-3403(1) after July, 1989; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40-1299.42(B)(1) (West 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60H (West Supp.
1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483 (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (West 1988); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 2-9-108, 25-9-411 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44.2825(1) (1998); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7II (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-8 (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1978); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120(a) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1998); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (Michie 1987); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 45901, § 11.02 (West
Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 1992
& Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55(4)(d) (West 1997).
Two states, Kentucky and Ohio, have recently repealed malpractice caps. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.40-270 (Banks-Baldwin 1999).
Arizona and Wyoming have adopted constitutional provisions, stating "no laws shall be enacted in
this State limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or injury of any
person." ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 31; WYO. CONST. art. X, § 4.
96. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1994) (giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction); 28
U.S.C. § 2402 (1994) (prohibiting jury trials); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (prohibiting punitive
damages and prejudgment interest). Additionally the FTCA includes several specific prohibitions
on governmental liability, such as prohibitions on liability for claims arising in a foreign country,
involving performance of a discretionary function, and certain intentional torts such as assault and
battery. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1994).
97. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
98. The effort to enact federal tort claims legislation began as early as the 1920s. See
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 86, at §§ 2.01-2.03. The hearings and reports on the 1940
and 1942 measures are generally considered to be valuable resources in analyzing the ultimate Act
passed in 1946. See id.; see also Hearings on H. Con. Res. 18 Before the Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress, 79th Cong. (1945); Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. (1942); Hearings on S. 2690 Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. (1940); Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. (1940).
99. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1962).
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years ago in Richards v. United States, " neither principles of strict
construction nor failure to anticipate the specific choice of law issue compels
a narrow definition of "place." The Supreme Court's analysis of "law of the
place," as permitting reference to the "whole law" of the state where the act
or omission occurred, is instructive on the issue of "tribal law" as one
alternative for law of the "place."101
In Richards, the suit arose out of the now-classic fact pattern, an airplane
en route from State A to State B, that crashes, causing injury and death in
State C. The cause of the crash was negligent acts that arguably occurred in
State A." The Supreme Court concluded that although the parties were
bound by the clear expression of the FTCA to look first to the law of State
A, where the negligent "acts" occurred, if State A had adopted choice-of-law
rules referring the court to the law of State C as the "place where the
negligence had its operative effect," the FTCA's language was inherently
flexible, permitting such movement. 0 3  The ultimate result, applying the
substantive law of a state that was not the place where the act or omission
occurred, was not barred by legislative history showing that "Congress did
not consider choice-of-law problems during the long period when the
legislation was being prepared for enactment."' °4 The Supreme Court noted:
In the Tort Claims Act Congress has expressly stated that the
Government's liability is to be determined by the application of a
particular law, the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred, and we must, of course, start with the assumption that
the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used .... We conclude that Congress has, in the Tort
Claims Act, enacted a rule which requires federal courts, in
100. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
101. For a critique of the Supreme Court's decision to recognize whole law under the FTCA,
see James Shapiro, Choice of Law Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Richards and Renvoi
Revisited, 70 N.C. L. REV. 641 (1992).
102. See Richards, 369 U.S. at 3. In Richards, the passengers were killed when an American
Airlines airplane crashed in Missouri (for analytical purposes, denominated State C), while en route
from Tulsa, Oklahoma (State A) to New York (State B). The allegation of negligence was the Civil
Aviation Agency's failure to enforce flight regulations in State A, at the Tulsa, Oklahoma overhaul
depot. See id.
103. Id. at 12-13.
Should the States continue this rejection of the older [choice of law] rule in
those situations were its application might appear inappropriate or inequitable,
the flexibility inherent in our interpretation will also be more in step with that
judicial approach, as well as with the character of the legislation and with the
purpose of the purpose of the Act considered as a whole.
Id. at 13.
104. Id. at 8.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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multistate tort actions, to look in the first instance to the law of the
place where the acts of negligence took place.'
05
The Supreme Court further noted that Congress had left to the judiciary the
task of providing "content" to its will in selecting the controlling law.
0 6
The Supreme Court's interpretation of "law of the place" in the FTCA as
including the "whole law" of the place has been strongly criticized, with the
major criticism being that the effect of such a decision is to permit federal
courts to avoid or "escape" restrictive state laws, in search of a better
potential recovery for plaintiffs. 07 The criticism is that the Richards decision
has proven to be too pro-plaintiff in effect, and therefore the interpretation is
at odds with the notion that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly
construed.'0 8 However, the same critic points out that the legislative history
of the FTCA supports a conclusion that Congress intended there to be an
application of "local" law to the tort problem, not the local law's reference
to foreign law.0 9 In the more than fifty years since the enactment of the
FTCA, Congress has had ample opportunity to change the FTCA in response
to any perceived floodgate of satisfied plaintiffs and Congress has not done
so. Certainly, an interpretation of the FTCA's reference to place as
including the most relevant "local" law, which may now include tribal law,
may serve to increase the scope of the federal government's liability for
damages. But this "filling in of the blanks" in the FTCA seems to be exactly
the sort of function that courts are expected to provide under a statute which
starts off by providing at least fifty different choices in substantive law.
105. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
106. See id. at 7-8.
107. See Shapiro, supra note 101, at 677-78. James Shapiro, writing his article in 1991 while
an Assistant United States Attorney, has obvious experience in the FTCA and makes impressive use
of case histories to support his argument about the effects of the Supreme Court's decision in
Richards. See id. at 669-74. Shapiro's criticism of the pro-plaintiff bias of choice-of-law under
Richards could be applied with equal weight to the entire modern history of Conflict of Laws,
although others would assert that the modern methodologies represent a more important search, for
rationality and fairness. See e.g., Dirk H. Bliesener, Fairness and Choice of Law: A Critique of the
Political Rights-Based Approach to the Conflict of Laws, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 687 (1994).
108. See Shapiro, supra note 101, at 645.
More often than not, Richards's effect has been adverse to the United States,
because the lower federal courts have often used the Supreme Court's flexible
choice of law rule to choose the law of a state that affords plaintiffs a larger
recovery than would be had under another state's law. Moreover, [the
decision in] Richards is internally inconsistent [and] contravenes congressional
intent ....
Id. (citations omitted).
109. See id. at 657-59. "'Local tort law' would seem to suggest congressional contemplation
of the internal law rather than whole law of the state where the negligent act or omission occurred."
Id. at 657-58.
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In creating a judicially decided claim process, Congress should have been
aware of the potential for conflicts of law involving the federal, state and
tribal governments, even if it did not contemplate or address such a potential
by creating specific limitations on choice-of-law in the FTCA. For example,
as early as the 1830s, the issue of tribal versus state or federal authority was
the subject of hot debate and major court challenges. In 1832, the Supreme
Court noted that state laws "can have no force" within a distinct tribal
territory unless Congress expressly authorizes that application of state law."°
Ten years before the adoption of the FTCA, in one of its many iterations of
federal policy towards Indians, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization
Act, with a purported goal of encouraging tribal self-government, by
authorizing tribes to adopt constitutions and by-laws."' With this
background, if Congress had been concerned with choice-of-law problems,
Congress could have eliminated any suggestion of tribal law under the FTCA
by express limitation of applicable choices to "state and territorial law."12
As the Supreme Court concluded in Richards, if Congress intended "to alter
or supplant the legal relationships developed by the States, it could
specifically have done so to further the limited objectives of the Tort Claims
Act . . . . Congress, in waiving the immunity of the Government . . . could
have imposed restrictions and conditions on the extent and substance of its
liability. "113
Identifying the source of substantive law under the FTCA is usually a
fairly routine matter, given the specificity of the statute's reference to law of
the place "where the act or omission occurred," which has been interpreted
as preventing application of the law of the place where the negligence had its
110. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 562 (1832); see also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S.
(8 Wheat.) 543 (1832) (recognizing a limited right of "occupancy" rather than true ownership for
Indians in reservation land in dispute); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)
(holding Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation but rather a "domestic dependent nation,"
subject to sovereignty of the U.S. federal government); RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE
SPIRITS (1975) (tracing history of Cherokee law from "clan to court"). For a concise discussion of
the early Cherokee cases, see CANBY, supra note 5, at 13-18.
111. See Wheeler-Howard Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1983); see also CANBY, supra note 5,
at 24-25.
112. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1994) (specifying that for negligence occurring within a
"national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," the cause of
action "shall exist as though the place were under the jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior
boundaries such place may be . . ."). It seems clear that tribes are not included within the usual
definition given to "territories" under federal law. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
321 (1978) (contrasting the relative sovereignty of tribal governments with federal authority over
territorial governments, noting the latter are "entirely the creation of Congress").
113. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). In 1966, Congress adopted a specific
jurisdictional statute, providing a federal court forum for civil actions alleging federal questions
"brought by any Indian tribe or band . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
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"operative effect.""14 Despite the Richards case, attempts to avoid "unfair"
results caused by rigid application of the rule are often unsuccessful," 5 in
large part because of the court's focus on the one place that can be pointed to
as the situs of the negligent conduct." 6 The superficial simplicity of a black
letter rule for choice-of-law is attractive to some observers, thus supporting
an argument that the courts should give a strict interpretation to "place"
under the FTCA. However, as one commentator has noted,
Lying at the heart of all conflicts theories is a recognition that the
function of the law of conflicts is to ensure rational and just
solutions to controversies involving foreign elements. A just and
rational solution is one that somehow accommodates those
elements. This does not mean that the foreign law must be applied
but simply suggests that at least some attention should be paid to
that law in the process of resolving disputes. 1'
To summarize, even though Congress probably did not contemplate tribal
law as one of the specific options for choice-of-law under the FTCA, its use
of the phrase "place where the act or omission occurred,"" 8 particularly as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Richards, is broad enough to include,
rather than specifically to exclude, recognition of tribal law.
114. Richards, 369 U.S. at 10.
115. See, e.g., Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091, 1091 (4th Cir. 1991) (ruling that
under law of Maryland, medical malpractice claim for "loss of substantial possibility of recovery"
was not cognizable); Gaj v. United States, 800 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1986) (interpreting
Pennsylvania tort law as not recognizing cause of action based on refusal to rehire because of
employee's history of making safety complaints); Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 474 (7th
Cir. 1981) (interpreting Alabama law as unlikely to recognize a cause of action for "wrongful life"
as opposed to "wrongful birth"). But see Richards, 369 U.S. at 1 (permitting the parties to escape
the effect of the rigid rule, if the whole law of the state permits reference to a state with more
significant contacts).
116. But see Brock v. United States, 601 F.2d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1979) (adopting a "territorial
interpretation of 'law of the place,'" and therefore applying Washington state law to FTCA death
claims on the Columbia River, even though Oregon and Washington had "concurrent jurisdiction"
over the Columbia River).
117. Gregory S. Alexander, The Application and Avoidance of Foreign Law in the Law of
Conflicts, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 602 (1975).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
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2. State Law vs. Tribal Law: Modern Choice-of-Law Analysis
a. Outside the FTCA
Over the years, the Supreme Court has largely focused on the court's
adjudicative jurisdiction or jurisdiction to decide a civil case, rather than on
the court's selection of controlling law," 9 as the central concern in multi-
jurisdictional disputes having tribal, state and/or federal interests.12 In
determining jurisdiction, and in the absence of federal statutory authority,'
the Court has undertaken what some have called a "particularized inquiry"
into the nature of the state, federal and tribal interests involved in the suit."
The cases have resulted in elaborate, if sometimes confusing, rules about
when state, federal or tribal courts should be allowed to hear cases.
To summarize the state of civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in Indian
country, then, a few general lines can be drawn. When a case
involves no tribal members or persons in a consensual relationship
with the tribe or its members, and does not affect tribal self-
government, the state courts do have jurisdiction. When Indians or
Indian interests are involved, at least on trust (non-fee) land, state
power is usually excluded unless federal statutes or treaties confer
119. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (applying tribal court exhaustion
requirement to federal diversity suit arising out of on-reservation accident, injured Indian, and non-
Indian insurance company ); National Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)
(holding that title 28 section 1331 jurisdiction did exist in federal court but that jurisdiction should
be deferred until the tribal court had ruled on the underlyirig case, noting three situations where
exhaustion of tribal court was not mandatory); see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959)
(holding that Arizona had no jurisdiction over suit by non-Indian general store owner against Indian
debtor for a debt incurred on the reservation). But see Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) (holding that tribal court had no jurisdiction over auto accident on state highway crossing
reservation where suit was between two non-members).
120. See, e.g., Kevin Glover, Jurisdiction: Conflicts of Law and the Indian Reservation:
Solutions to Problems in Indian Civil Jurisdiction, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 361 (1980) (identifying
unresolved questions of conflicting laws).
121. Public Law 280, by permitting certain states to exercise jurisdiction over Indian country
in certain instances, is the major statutory exception to the Supreme Court's efforts to define the
exclusivity of tribal jurisdiction. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat.
588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1325, and 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1988)); see, e.g., CANBY, supra note 5, at 221-25 (discussing Public Law 280); DESKBOOK, supra
note 10, at 159-63 (discussing Public Law 280); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of
State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975), reprinted in CAROLE
GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at
45-124 (1997). Public Law 280 provides that the state shall apply "any tribal ordinance or custom"
adopted by the tribe to the extent "not inconsistent" with state civil laws. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c).
New Mexico has not chosen to assume criminal or civil jurisdiction over Indian country under the
optional provisions of Public Law 280. See CANBY, supra note 5, at 234-35.
122. See DESKBOOK, supra note 10, at 153-54.
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it. For claims arising on fee lands, a tribal member must be sued
in tribal court and a non-member perhaps in state court. Any such
generalizations are subject, however, to many qualifications
123
Although some state courts have expressed a willingness to apply tribal
law to resolve civil disputes, the Supreme Court, while not directly
addressing choice-of-law, has observed that the essential sovereignty of the
tribe will often be compromised by the exercise of state court jurisdiction to
decide cases.'2 5 In the context of a non-Indian's state court suit for a debt
incurred by Navajos on the Navajo reservation, the Supreme Court said,
"There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs
and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves." 26 Even in the instance of an Indian plaintiffs suit filed in state
court against a non-Indian, if the claims are viewed as involving essential
tribal interests, the exercise of state court jurisdiction "is probably contrary
to existing law because the tribal interest in adjudicating actions involving its
members would seem to be infringed by state court jurisdiction even though
the individual member voluntarily sought to invoke state jurisdiction. "'27
123. CANBY, supra note 5, at 141; see also id. at 209-11 (providing, in chart form, a
summary of civil jurisdiction in Indian country, divided by party identity and type of suit).
124. See, e.g., Warm Spring Forest Prods. Indus. v. Employee Benefits Ins., 716 P.2d 740
(Or. 1986) (considering tribal law, but concluding that based on all the facts the parties intended
Oregon law to apply under insurance policy); Begay v. First Nat'l Bank of Farmington, 499 P.2d
1005 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972) (holding plaintiff had burden to prove that repossession occurred on
Navajo Reservation in order to recover for claim of unlawful repossession of truck in violation of
Navajo Tribal Code). But see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chischilly, 628 P.2d 683
(N.M. 1981) (reversing Court of Appeals application of tribal law and holding that Navajo law
cannot be applied to repossession of Navajo's truck off of Navajo reservation).
125. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that Arizona courts had no
jurisdiction over suit by non-Indian trader against Navajos for non-payment of debt incurred on
Navajo reservation).
126. Id. at 223. Despite this strong statement in favor of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction and
barring state court jurisdiction over the particular non-Indian's suit, the Williams case has been
criticized as marking the beginning of the Supreme Court's modern erosion of tribal sovereignty.
While Navajo sovereignty was reaffirmed, [in Williams v. Lee] the Supreme
Court departed from the Worcester ruling of complete state exclusion from
Indian country by holding that the states might be allowed to extend their
jurisdiction into tribal trust land, unless their action "infringed on the right of
the reservation Indians to make and enforce their own laws and be ruled by
them."
WILKINS, supra note 10, at 276.
127. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 46, at 392 n. 23 (questioning the decision in Paiz v. Hughes,
417 P.2d 51 (N.M. 1996) (upholding state court jurisdiction over a personal injury suit brought by
Indians against non-Indian involving accident arising within Indian country)). But see CANBY,
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When the opportunity arose for federal courts to consider applying tribal
law in choice-of-law problems in certain federal cases,"2 including diversity
cases, 29 the Supreme Court again cited the need to protect essential tribal
authority as the basis for "exhaustion" and "deferral" policies, which require
the federal courts to permit tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction in the first
instance. More recently, the Supreme Court expressly avoided the issue of
"governing law," but held that a tribal court lacked jurisdiction to decide a
personal injury case between non-Indians arising from an auto accident on a
state highway running through a tribal reservation. 3 ' Thus, federal law
about Indians has, until now, depended on approaches that largely avoid the
choice-of-law approaches used by courts for state-to-state, or state-to-federal
disputes.
The application of tribal law would often lead to a surprisingly
uncontroversial result. Many tribal codes provide a priority list for sources
of governing legal principles, often beginning the list with "federal law" and
including "state law" as a choice.' Therefore, frequently tribal law mirrors
state law. The Acoma tribe, however, repealed such a code provision,
reportedly because of concern that non-Indian courts might jump to a
conclusion that tribal law was the same as state law in any instance where the
Acoma code was silent.
32
supra note 5, at 242 (observing that "[wihatever the analytical difficulties, the result [of the
Supreme Court's decision in Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986)]
is clear: Indian plaintiffs are guaranteed access to state courts for suits against non-Indians").
128. See National Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (refusing to
foreclose tribal court jurisdiction over civil dispute involving non-Indian defendant, instead applying
"exhaustion" requirement, requiring parties to submit case to tribal court before any related federal
court action would be heard). But see El Paso Nat'l Gas v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999) (ruling
that exhaustion doctrine does not require tribal court to be given first opportunity to determine
jurisdiction related to Price-Anderson Act).
129. See Iowa Mut. Ins. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (refusing to permit non-Indian's
diversity suit to go forward in federal court during pendency of related tribal suit, recognizing need
to "exhaust" tribal court remedy).
130. See Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997). The Supreme Court further
distinguished the cases of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, describing them as merely
establishing "a prudential rule based on comity." Id. at 453.
131. See CANBY, supra note 5, at 214; see also Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One
Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 299 (1998) (noting
that some tribal codes, in ranking sources, "place state law immediately after tribal law").
132. See Telephone Interview with Ann Rodgers, Counsel to the Acoma Pueblo Tribe,
Albuquerque, New Mexico (September 3, 1999) [hereinafter Rodgers Interview] (on file with
author); cf. 2 Acoma Tribal Code § 2(c) (1971) ("Any matters that are not covered by the
traditional customs and usages of the Acoma Pueblo Tribe or by applicable Federal laws or by
Tribal ordinances shall be decided by the Acoma Pueblo Tribal Court according to the laws of the
state of New Mexico . . . .") (on file with author) with Acoma Tribal Code § 1-1-4 (noting repeal
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Although the exact parameters of state-tribal jurisdiction and the
exhaustion and deferral doctrines of federal law about Indians are still
unclear,'33 such major choice-of-law theories as that of the Restatement
(Second) on Conflict of Laws, Professor Currie's interest analysis, and
Leflar's Better Rule approach, have developed with little direct discussion of
tribal law as a viable possibility. Indeed, it would seem that the possibility
that tribal law can be applied by a non-Indian court, under the Cheromiah
case approach to the FTCA, may also cause courts, particularly the Supreme
Court, to reconsider the need to protect exclusive tribal court jurisdiction,
especially where the Indian plaintiff files in state court, or in federal court
sitting in diversity, and seeks application of tribal law.
b. Under the FTCA
The FTCA clearly provides an exclusive federal court forum,'34 thus
preventing the court from using a jurisdictional approach to avoid choice-of-
law issues and the related sovereignty concerns. Neither exhaustion
requirements nor deferral to the tribal court process seems to be permitted by
the explicit language of the FTCA. Prior to Cheromiah, the federal courts
have, for the most part, simply ignored the tribal law possibilities in an
FTCA case. After Cheromiah, however, once the statute's reference to "law
of the place" is recognized as having two potential definitions, a selection of
controlling law must be made and the process begins to look a lot like the
choice-of-law process for any tort suit having interstate aspects. In the
Cheromiah context, instead of two different states, the choice is between two
different places. Since both "places" are where the act or omission
occurred, the choice-of-law problem is which "place-law" should control.
As demonstrated below, the analysis employed by Judge Visquez, while
of prior codes) and § 1-1-5 (1995) (recognizing written laws as supplemented by "rich customary or
common law tradition") (on file with author).
133. See John Fredericks, America's First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 347 (1999) (noting contradictions in Supreme Court's
recent declarations of "implicit limitations" on tribal sovereignty); Laurie Reynolds, Adjudication in
Indian Country; The Confusing Parameters of State, Federal, and Tribunal Jurisdiction, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 539 (1997) (noting two lines of cases involving state court adjudication of Indian
plaintiff suits, one following Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), and barring state court
adjudication, and one following Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986),
as authority for permitting state court suits); Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian
Law: Confusion, Contradiction and Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV 359 (1997) (noting
inconsistencies in Supreme Court decisions involving disputes in tribal jurisdiction).
134. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999). "[Tlhe district courts, together with
the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . . " Id. (emphasis added).
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undoubtedly surprising to the rather specialized world of FTCA
practitioners, actually mirrors the dominant approach in modem conflict of
laws jurisprudence, by rejecting adherence to a rigid rule, in recognition of
multiple connecting factors which establish the greater significance of one
place's law.
Outside the context of the Tort Claims Act, several choice-of-law
methodologies are currently recognized in the United States.' 35  The
traditional approach, captured by the first Restatement on Conflict of Laws,
involves application of black letter rules, usually applying the law of the
place of the wrong for tort issues."' However, courts and commentators
recognized the seeming arbitrariness of the traditional rules, thus giving rise
to a search for an approach that blended predictability with fairness in
specific cases, a search which has dominated choice-of-law methodology for
the last fifty years. 
37
Central among the modem theories is the general approach taken by the
Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws. 38  A full description of the
Restatement (Second)'s approach takes multiple volumes and can trigger
enormous debate, 39 but for analytical purposes here, the Restatement can be
summarized as giving priority to traditional so-called "black letter" rules,
while at the same time providing the court with flexibility to select the law of
the state having the "more significant relationship" to the key legal events
135. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 167-267 (discussing the traditional
approach to choice of law as embodied in the First Restatement, and tracing the development of
modem theories, including the Restatement (Second), Currie's interest analysis, and Leflar's better
rule); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 46, at 569-625 (discussing choice-of-law approaches for torts).
136. Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934) (defining the law of the
place of the wrong as the "state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged
tort takes place") with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1969).
137. Often cited as an example of an unfortunate result under rigidly applied traditional rules
is Alabama Great Southern R.R. v. Carroll, I1 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (applying the law of the "place
of the wrong," defeating the plaintiffs right to recovery, despite clear negligence, because the state
where the injury occurred recognized the fellow servant rule, even though all other contacts, such
as the parties' residences, the contract of employment, and the place where the negligent acts
happened, occurred in states without a fellow servant rule). See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra
note 46, at 171-76.
138. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS. For more than ten years,
Symeon S. Symeonides, now Dean at Willamette University School of Law, has provided excellent
summaries of trends in Conflict of Laws, showing the dominance of the Restatement (Second), as
well as the influence of other methodologies. See e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in
the American Courts in 1997, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 233 (1998).
139. See, e.g., Consensus or Chaos in American Conflicts Law?, in A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS
ANTHOLOGY (Gene R. Shreve ed. 1997).
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and parties.140 In other words, the Restatement usually points to one state as
having a presumptive "most significant relationship" to the cause of action,
while permitting parties to present arguments in favor of a "more"
significant state. 141
Although the Restatement frequently uses the word "state" to describe
relevant choices, the word is not restricted in meaning to the fifty American
states, but, rather, "denotes a territorial unit with a distinct general body of
law."142 This definition would appear to permit reference to tribal law. For
example, the Commentary to the Restatement (Second) notes:
The law of a state is not necessarily applicable in all its aspects to
every person or place within the state. Thus, different classes of
persons or different localities may be governed by different laws,
or local subdivisions of a state may be allowed by the state to make
certain laws applicable within their own boundaries ....
Accordingly, under the Restatement (Second), the law of the "state" can
include more localized laws. Similarly, under the FTCA, it seems
appropriate to recognize that the law of the "place" can, in certain instances,
include the law of the tribe.
For wrongful death claims, the Restatement (Second)'s approach is
expressed in Section 175 as follows:
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties
unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a
more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to
the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the
other state will be applied. 144
Section 6, cross-referenced by Section 175, provides a list of factors
relevant to determination of a "more" significant relationship, including "the
needs of the interstate and international systems," the policies of the forum in
which the action is tried, "the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
140. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 188(3) ("[I]f the place of
negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this
state will usually be applied, except as otherwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.").
141. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 195-98 (discussing the Restatement
(Second)). "[T]he presumptive choice of law usually can be trumped if some other state has a
'more significant relationship' with the problem." Id. at 197.
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 3.
143. Id. at cmt. b.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 175; see also id. § 178 (regarding damages
recoverable in a wrongful death action, corresponding with § 175).
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issue," the possibility of a need to "protect[ ] justified expectations," the
policies "underlying the particular field of law," and the "ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied."' The approach
taken by the Restatement (Second), looking for a connection between the
parties, the allegations of fault, the interests of the political entities, and the
law to be applied, is similar to Judge Vdsquez' inquiry, which led her to the
conclusion that tribal law had a more significant relationship than state law to
a cause of action for damages arising from medical malpractice on tribal
lands. 146
It helps to compare the Cheromiah fact pattern to one involving less
significant tribal law connecting factors. Assume, for the moment, that New
Mexico state law precludes recovery for loss of consortium, while the
particular tribe's law -expressly provides for damages for loss of
consortium. 47 The federal employee, driving a federally-owned vehicle on
his way to deliver goods to the ACL Hospital in San Fidel, New Mexico,
negligently causes an auto accident within the territorial boundaries of the
Acoma tribe, while driving on a road maintained by the tribe. The fatally
injured party is non-Indian, an Albuquerque resident, returning from a visit
with friends at the Pueblo. The negligent "act or omission" clearly occurs
within tribal borders. Consistent with Cheromiah, a broad reading of the
FTCA's reference to "law of the place" would permit Acoma tribal law to be
considered as one alternative law to be applied to the tort case. The
presumptive rule of Section 175 of the Restatement (Second) would appear to
permit a similar result, using the broad definition of "state" in Section 3 to
include more localized laws such as tribal law. But, here is where the
Restatement (Second) analysis assists in understanding Judge Visquez'
approach; the "more" significant relationship in the hypothetical appears to
be with state law. The injury will have an impact on the place of common
domicile of the decedent and the beneficiaries, thereby establishing a strong
tie to state law, while the tribe has relatively little interest in the outcome of
the case, an important factor to be considered under Section 6's reference to
145. Id. § 6. "These principles can be organized into three basic topics: governmental
interests, party interests, and the interests involving the administration of justice." RICHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 196.
146. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1301-08 (D.N.M. 1999).
147. The Cheromiah court stated:
It is true that although New Mexico recognizes loss of consortium claims for
the death of a minor child, State law does not permit such claims for the
parents of an adult child . . . .However, the parties have provided the Court
with no information as to how Acoma tribal law treats such claims.
Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (citing Solon v. WEK Drilling, 829 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1992);
Fernandez v. Walgreen Hastings Co., 968 P.2d 774 (N.M. 1998)).
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"the relevant policies of the forum, . . . the relevant polices of other
interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue."148  New Mexico becomes the closest thing to a
common domicile of all of the parties to the tort, thus "[i]n a situation where
one state is the state of domicile of the defendant, the decedent and the
beneficiaries, it would seem that, ordinarily at least, the wrongful death
statute of this state should be applied to determine the measure of
damages.""' In the non-Indian auto accident hypothetical, there should be
little surprise caused by application of the New Mexico state law on damages
even though it defeats the non-Indian's claim for loss of consortium.
As one commentary notes when discussing the law on modem conflicts,
in order for a jurisdiction to have an "interest" in having its law
applied it is necessary that the purpose behind the law be furthered
by that application. Mere contact with a state is not enough; there
must also be a functional relationship between the contact and the
legal issue to be resolved.50
The inquiry into the respective governmental interests underlying the choice-
of-law issues is a hallmark of modem Conflict doctrines.'' The outcome of
the particular choice-of-law problem is obviously affected by the relative
strength or weakness of factors pointing to a strong tribal interest in
application of tribal law.
Before taking a closer look in the next section of this article at the use of
interest analysis when considering tribal law under the FTCA, it should be
noted that it is possible that the Restatement (Second) may have another role
to play in selection of tribal law, a role which is not dependent on the
alternative state or tribal definition of "place" under the Act. A simple
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 6; see also § 178, regarding the measure of
damages in an action for wrongful death. As noted by Comment (b) to Section 178, "The state of
conduct and injury will not, by reason of these contacts alone, be the state which is primarily
concerned with the measure of damages in a wrongful death action." Id.
149. Id. at cmt. b.
150. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 196.
151. In referring here to "government interests," I am not referring to Professor Brainerd
Currie's original model for analyzing choice-of-law problems, which, while important, is rarely
applied in its pure form. See generally RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 212-27 (outlining
in concise form, with useful diagrams, Currie's interest analysis and more modern adaptations of
the approach). Rather, I am referring to the method by which many courts employ interest
analysis, often as one of the listed factors under section 6 of the Restatement (Second), and often
with an express goal of determining the existence of any unavoidable conflicts. See id.; see also
Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Law: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743,
1756 (1992) ("Classic interest analysis cannot resolve true conflicts. That is not what interest
analysis is for. The essential use of interest analysis is to identify conflicts, not to resolve them.").
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illustration is helpful. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Richards, the
"whole law" of the "state" is to be applied under the FTCA. If the state
follows the Restatement (Second), the court could be required to determine
whether tribal law has the "most significant relationship" to the cause of
action. 112
An argument can be made that it is unnecessary to determine the most
significant relationship because of the black letter rule approach of the
FTCA, particularly where, as in New Mexico, the forum state does not
follow the Restatement (Second) for choice-of-law. It is true that the "whole
law" of New Mexico includes "traditional" choice-of-law riles for negligent
torts."'53 Indeed, the New Mexico Supreme Court has noted modem trends'54
but has announced its preference in favor of relative "certainty" by following
a lex loci delicti approach to choice-of-law for torts, applying the law of the
state where the "injury occurs."' Nevertheless, this argument may prove
too much, because the New Mexico courts have recognized at least the
potential for tribal law to apply under their traditional choice-of-law rules.'56
152. Just to make matters a bit more interesting, it is also possible that the whole law of the
tribe, including its choice-of-law rules, may refer the case to non-tribal law. See, e.g., Frank
Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 329, 337 n.61 (1989) (discussing the Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribal Code); see also supra notes
130-31 and accompanying text.
153. See Estate of Gilmore, 946 P.2d 1130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (applying traditional
doctrine of lex loci delicti, or law of the place where the wrong took place to tort claim); see also
Torres v. State, 894 P.2d 386, 390 (N.M. 1995) (noting New Mexico generally follows the
doctrine of lex loci delicti). Thus, in New Mexico, the court has applied the New Mexico
Wrongful Death Act to a claim arising from the death of Missouri residents when their plane
crashed in New Mexico. See First National Bank v. Benson, 553 P.2d 1288 (N.M. Ct. App.
1976). New Mexico views place of the wrong as "the location of the last act necessary to complete
the injury." Wittkowski v. State Corrections Dept. 710 P.2d 93, 95 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985),
overruled on other grounds, Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380, 385 (N.M. 1987).
154. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Ins. v. Conyers, 784 P.2d 986, 989 (N.M. 1989) (applying
New Mexico law to an insurance policy offset issue, discussing modem choice of law trends, and
noting than New Mexico does not apply traditional rules in a mechanical fashion but rather looks to
the interests of the states involved).
155. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Chischilly v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 629 P.2d 340, 344 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1980) (using state's choice-of-law rules in applying Navajo law rather than New Mexico law
to substantive claim, noting that repossession occurred on Indian land), rev'd subnom., General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chischilly, 628 P.2d 683 (N.M. 1981) (noting that parties had now
stipulated that repossession occurred off reservation land, and holding that application of Navajo
law to non-Indian's repossession of Navajo member's truck was therefore unjustified, emphasizing
the extraterritorial nature of the repossession); Begay v. First Nat'l Bank of Farmington, 499 P.2d
1005 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that in order to recover for unlawful repossession of truck in
violation of Navajo Tribal code, plaintiff had burden of proving repossession occurred on Navajo
land); see also Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975) (holding Navajo tribal law
entitled to full faith and credit under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)).
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Thus, even if the whole law of the "state" is applied, it is possible that a
court should conclude that the conflict rule requires reference to tribal law,
where as in Cheromiah, the injury occurred on tribal land and involved
tribal-member health concerns.
Returning to the choice of "place" issue, Judge Visquez' approach,
particularly when viewed in comparison to the analytical approach of modern
Conflicts doctrine, provides the opportunity to give appropriate recognition
to the often significant connection between the issue and the tribe. Thus, in
certain circumstances, the door now should be viewed as open for application
of tribal law as the more significant "law of the place" under the FTCA.
3. Recognizing the Unique Context: Interest Analysis and Damages for
Medical Malpractice
As tribal law is shown to have the "more significant connection" to
FTCA issues, it seems consistent with the purpose behind the Act for federal
courts simply to recognize and apply tribal law.'57 Nonetheless, the history
of federal Indian law has been shaped by a relatively specialized body of
conflicts of law, rulings which reflect a tension between the congressional
and judicial views on tribal sovereignty, and a continuing, perhaps mutual,
distrust of the "foreign" jurisdiction's power to decide.'58 As outlined briefly
above,5 9 the focus in federal Indian law cases has often been on adjudicative
authority or jurisdiction to decide disputes, rather than on the choice-of-law
used by the jurisdiction to decide disputes."W The FTCA, when interpreted
to permit application of tribal law, would seem to change the focus and
ameliorate some of the historical concerns, at least when Indian parties are
157. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955) ("The broad and just
purpose which the statute was designed to effect was to compensate the victims of negligence . . . in
circumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable . . ").
158. See Newton, supra note 131 (describing some non-Indians' belief that tribal courts are
not neutral, justice-administering institutions, but providing countering arguments based on author's
analysis of eighty-five reported tribal opinions from the year 1996).
159. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.b.
160. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (concluding that absent a statute or
treaty, tribal court may not entertain claims against non-Indians arising out of accident on state
highway running through Indian reservation, but expressing "no view" on governing law to be
imposed by ultimate venue); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that in absence of
specific grant of jurisdiction, state court could not exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian's suit to
collect debt allegedly incurred by Navajo at reservation store); see also CANBY, supra note 5, at 2.
"Indian Law is greatly concerned with actual or potential conflicts of governmental power. When
such conflicts arise in a legal setting, they appear as issues of jurisdiction. It is not surprising,
therefore, that controversies in Indian Law usually have at their source a jurisdictional dispute."
Id.
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volunteering, in a sense, to have their claims heard in federal court and to be
subject to specific federal limits, such as the lack of punitive damages or
prejudgment interest. And-yet, while it is tempting to simplify the matter of
choice-of-law in the Cheromiah types of cases by focusing only on the
seemingly obvious answer that modem tribal law provides a viable choice
under the FTCA, such temptation perhaps too conveniently ignores the
complicated history of Indian law. Federal law about Indians is a type of
"interest analysis," a concept central to modem doctrine on Conflicts of
Law.
Ironically, just as the FTCA's choice-of-law focus is on "place," the
focus of much of the federal law about Indians has been on "place,"
beginning with the concept of "Indian country." 6' Civil cases often use the
definition contained in the federal criminal laws, which defines Indian
country to include: (1) "all land within the limits of" federally recognized
Indian reservations, regardless of ownership status; (2) all "dependent
Indian communities," a phrase which has been construed as including the
Pueblos in New Mexico; and (3) all allotted land held in trust by the United
States. 62 The definition of Indian country may also include land "owned"
by non-Indians. 63 Although in recent years the concept of "Indian country"
has assumed less importance in the ultimate outcome of sovereignty
questions," 4 it seems safe to say that whenever the key events of a civil
dispute take place within Indian country, the federalized inquiry into Indian
authority begins.
Judge Vfsquez recognized this history, noting that before answering the
direct question on choice-of-law, the court "must pause to recognize the
principles embodied in federal case law which inform any analysis of the
exercise of Indian sovereign authority." 65 She turned to the Montana/Strate
analysis because she treated the Cheromiahs' claim as raising a question of
permissible Indian authority over non-Indian actors on land which was
subject to less than full tribal authority.' By concluding that the tribal court
161. See DESKBOOK, supra note 10, at 28. "Fundamental to virtually all analysis of Indian
law is an understanding of the terms 'Indian,' 'Indian tribe,' and 'Indian country.'" Id.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1984); see also DESKBOOK, supra note 10, at 2843; CANBY, supra
note 5, at 113; Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Board of County Comm'rs, 883 P.2d 136, 140 (N.M.
1994) (noting Tenth Circuit's use of similar definition for "Indian country").
163. See JOHANSEN, supra note 76, at 142.
164. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 77, at 78 (noting that "Indian Country in its original
expression has most probably been overtaken by contemporary events and now exists ...as a
backdrop concept. ").
165. Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (D.N.M. 1999).
166. The court felt "unduly hampered" by the failure of the United States to concede Indian
ownership of the land or to offer competing evidence of non-Indian ownership. "Nevertheless," for
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could, if the case was not governed by the FTCA's exclusive federal court
forum provision, have exercised valid "authority" over the contracting health
caregivers, she felt that the Supreme Court's concerns were satisfied.' 67 If
future courts follow the approach taken in the Cheromiah case, they must
conduct a fact-specific analysis similar to the Supreme Court's approach to
determine the permissible range of the tribe's adjudicative or regulatory
authority over non-Indian actors. 168  Regardless of whether the hospital
actually sits on Indian-owned land or non-Indian-owned land, if that land
falls within the concept of "Indian country," presumably there must still be
some analysis, some "Federal law about Indians," applied to test the fairness
of using tribal law under the FTCA.
It seems important to ask whether it is necessary to create some
specialized theory of Indian law to resolve these choice-of-law issues. Taken
from the perspective of Conflict of Laws scholarship, it appears that what is
really behind the court's inquiry into the fairness of applying tribal law under
the FTCA, is an inquiry into the respective governmental interests
underlying the issues. Modern Conflict of Laws doctrine permits such
choice-of-law questions to be resolved on an issue-by-issue basis,
recognizing in some circumstances that the most significant relationship
relates to the precise issue under consideration, and not merely to the parties,
the suit, or the substantive claim itself. 69  Thus, the relative government
interests associated with medical malpractice damage caps should be
assessed. One political entity may well have a strong interest in application
of its laws, particularly when it comes to full compensation of its
"domiciliaries," to use the conflict term. 1
70
purposes of completing the inquiry into choice-of-law, Judge Visquez assumed "that the Hospital
sits on land which, although within the territory of the tribe, is some how [sic] subject to less tribal
authority-as in Strate and Montana... ." Id. at 1304.
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., DESKBOOK supra note 10, at 130-68 (describing the different approaches to
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in state, federal and tribal courts).
169. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 161-62. "Depecage" is the term
sometimes used to refer to an issue-by-issue approach to choice-of-law. "Because modem choice-
of-law analysis focuses on individual issues (and policies) rather than on larger subject areas (e.g.,
torts, contracts), proponents of both interest analysis and the Restatement (Second) approach believe
that depecage will be more common under their systems than under the [traditional] vested rights
theory." Id. at 162.
170. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 163 (providing an example, based on the
case of Sabell v. Pacific Intennountain Fxpress, 536 P.2d 1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975) (involving an
auto accident in Iowa, where Colorado law can appropriately supply the rule about the effect of any
negligence on the part of the plaintiffs)). "Colorado had a valid interest in the question of whether
comparative or contributory negligence was applied in Colorado litigation between two Colorado
residents; Iowa had no interest in the resolution of that issue." Id.
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a. The First Step: The False Conflict
The first step in modem approaches to interest analysis is to determine,
from the purposes of the two apparently conflicting rules, whether they are
in fact in conflict.'
7'
For instance, analysis may show . that the policy underlying of
the potentially applicable rules calls for its application, while the
application of the competing rule would not serve to further any
policy underlying that rule. . . . In these circumstances, that is,
when there is no real conflict of purpose, there is a false or
spurious conflict, and the only rule whose purpose and policy
would be furthered by its application should be chosen to govern
the case or the issue.172
The "false conflict" analysis frees the court to apply the law of the state
which has the only clear interest in the outcome of the issue. The second
step is reached only if it appears that the legal rules of both places reflect
policies which would be furthered by application.'" Although Professor
Currie's original formulation of interest analysis called for application of
"forum law" in the rare case of a "true" conflict, most modem courts have
instead Weighed the competing interests represented by the true conflict,
choosing to apply the law of the state whose interest is "most appropriately
furthered by the subordination of the policy of the other state.""74
In Cheromiah, the choice-of-law inquiry was initially triggered by the
issue of whether a cap should be applied to damages incurred by the injured
plaintiff, and touched on two related damages issues. 17  Congress
presumably has the power to set limits on the dollar value of any damages
awarded under the FTCA for all tort claims, or some tort claims, but has
171. See RUSSELL 1. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 281 (3d ed.
1986) (noting that "first step in the solution of a choice-of-law problem in the torts area should be
the identification and elimination of spurious conflicts"); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990) (discussing the first step, whether there is a conflict of law, and the
second step, resolving true conflicts); see also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 46, at 622-26 (discussing
interest analysis).
172. SCOLES & HAY, supra 46, at 622 (emphasis in original).
173. See id. at 623.
174. Id.
175. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d. 1295, 1297 (D.N.M. 1999). "Plaintiffs
seek partial summary judgment in their favor that the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Cap does
not apply to the United States government . . . ." Id. Two related choice-of-law issues, however,
surfaced during the discussion of the original motion, whether a wrongful death case can be
maintained under tribal law in the absence of an applicable statute providing a remedy for wrongful
death, and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for loss of consortium under tribal law
when state law did not recognize such damages. See id at 1308-09.
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declined to do so on a national level, leaving the issue of damages open to
"place" law.' 76 The relationship between the federal government and the
tribe on the issue of medical health services appears to have almost nothing
to do with state regulation or control, and therefore has no connection to
state legislative decisions about the permissible scope of damages. For
example, New Mexico and Utah have adopted different caps for damages in
medical malpractice cases, and Arizona has no limitation, yet the Navajo
nation crosses the borders of all three states.'" When a tribal member
suffers damages at the reservation hospital, whether operated by private
money or the Indian Health Service, the effects are most likely felt within the
tribe, rather than by the state. In a sense, the issue of federally provided
medical services is uniquely federal-or uniquely tribal-but it certainly is
not directly concerned with state law. Thus, the answer to the first question,
is there a false conflict, would appear to be "yes," since any state interest is
missing.
What is sometimes given as a "classic" example of a false conflict,
making it relatively easy to apply one place's law, involves capacity to sue
for damages in tort.17
The husband and wife are domiciled in State F, a state that permits
the wife to sue the husband for personal injuries caused by the
husband's negligence. While a passenger in an automobile driven
by the husband in State X, the wife is injured as a result of the
husband's negligence. Under X law, a wife may not sue her
husband in tort. The wife brings suit against the husband in State
F. There is no true conflict. F, as the wife's domicile, will
advance at least some of the purposes underlying its rule permitting
suit-compensation to the wife to prevent her from becoming a
public charge and to ease her and the family's financial burden. 1
79
However, in the Cheromiah case, there is a slight alteration of this classic
pattern. The decedent, Michael Cheromiah, was an enrolled member of the
Laguna tribe, not the Acoma Pueblo, which provided the site for the ACL
176. "A ceiling on the amount that could be recovered on tort claims, either administratively
or judicially, was a provision common to most of the tort claims bills prior to the 1946 enactment."
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 86, at § 2.09[4] (emphasis added).
177. Cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (Michie 1978) (limiting total recovery on damages to
$600,000 in medical malpractice cases) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1 (1996) (limiting
noneconomic damages to $250,000 in medical malpractice cases), and with ARIZ. CONST. art. II, §
31, which prohibits state legislation to limit personal injury damages.
178. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 171, at 292.
179. Id. at 292-93.
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Hospital, and was the "place" of the negligent acts or omissions. 180
Arguably, this change in fact reduces the interest of the Acoma tribe in
having its damage law applied. Nonetheless, in determining whether there is
a false conflict, the place of the wrong is recognized as having an interest
beyond direct compensation for the injured plaintiff as a domiciliary. As one
commentary notes, a jurisdiction in the position of Acoma "has an interest in
shaping its tort rules so as to discourage conduct that will result in harmful
impacts within its borders.""8 Even though injuries to a non-Acoma Indian
may have few direct effects on the Acoma tribe, the prospect for damages to
Acoma tribal members caused by the federal hospital's negligence within its
borders creates the Acoma tribe's central government interest, dominating
the comparatively "spurious" interest of the state. In determining any
existence of a conflict in interests between state and tribal law, the "false
conflict" here seems well established. Going to the "second step" of interest
analysis is unnecessary on these facts.
b. Taking the Second Step: Weighing of Government Interests
One critic suggests that it is improper to look for false conflicts as a way
to decide choice-of-law under the FTCA because of the lack of a true "state
interest" that can be argued by the federal government to support application
of any state's law:
The modem choice of law approaches ...make choice of law
under the FTCA especially critical because the United States, the
only possible FTCA defendant, has no domicile for choice of law
purposes . . . .The lack of a one-state domicile for the United
States places increased weight on the plaintiff's domicile and other
factors in any modem choice of law analysis.'8
This criticism, directed to the Supreme Court's decision in Richards v.
United States,'" seems to have somewhat greater persuasive effect when the
result of a false conflict analysis is virtually automatic application of tribal
law.
180. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. The co-plaintiff and personal representative of
the estate of Michael Cheromiah was his mother, Diane Cheromiah, an enrolled member of the
Acoma tribe. See id. Therefore, the Acoma Pueblo continues to have an interest in full
compensation of its domiciliary.
181. WEINTRAUB, supra note 171, at 303.
182. Shapiro, supra note 101, at 644 n.11 (discussing author's position that Richards was
wrongly decided by the Supreme Court and that the court should not be given discretion to apply
non-place law under the "whole law" analysis).
183. 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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Perhaps the second question should be reached, to permit a weighing of
the government interests, assisted by throwing onto the scales any "federal"
interest in avoiding tribal law. This appears to be what occurred in
Cheromiah, where the court clearly engaged in a weighing of federal versus
tribal interests, using what the court recognized as federal Indian law
principles.
The history of federal Indian law often speaks of a "unique" relationship
between the federal government and Indians, 'usually focusing on "trust"
concepts. " Plaintiffs have attempted, unsuccessfully, to use the "trust"
concept as the basis for a negligence claim under the FTCA, arguing that the
federal government, through its employees, has breached certain duties
created by the trust relationship. " The court in Cheromiah, however,
recognized the unique federal-tribe relationship as part of its government
interest analysis, favoring application of tribal law to the malpractice tort
claim. " The court's focus was on the negligent actors' role in providing
health care services, or even more narrowly, emergency health care
services.' 7 Judge Vdsquez identified specific reasons supporting application
of localized tribal legal standards to damage claims for hospital
malpractice. 8 She noted that the "United States government has undertaken
the responsibility of providing the primary emergency medical care to the
members of the Acoma Tribe."189 Judge V.squez continued,
For all practical purposes, ACL Hospital provides the only western
medical care most Acoma Tribe members receive ....
Malpractice by the major medical provider to the Tribe has a
significant impact on "the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them" as it may jeopardize their very
ability to survive as a people. 190
In other words, Judge Visquez' analysis did not assume merely that the
federal government had a generalized obligation to provide services for
184. For a disturbing, current look at the "unique" relationship, see John Gibeaut, Another
Broken Trust, A.B.A. J., Sept., 1999, at 40 (reporting on the class action suit challenging the
government's stewardship of the land allotment program created in 1887); see also Cobell v.
Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding government officials in contempt for failure to
produce documents related to individual Indian money trust accounts).
185. See, e.g., Bear Medicine v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (D. Mont. 1999)
(refusing to recognize "breach of Indian trust" as a cause of action under the FTCA); see also
sources cited infra note 191.
186. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1304-07 (D.N.M. 1999).
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. Id. at 1305.
190. Id. (citing Strate v. A-i Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 458 (1997)).
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Indians, but that it had undertaken to provide specific medical services. The
court's interest analysis focused rather specifically on the assumption of a
duty to provide "health care."
It is generally acknowledged that health care services under the Indian
Health Service have improved significantly by comparison to the services
administered by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, yet critics continue to express
concern about the adequacy and quality of federal health services for Native
Americans.19  In 1976, Congress passed the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act (IHCIA) as a step toward providing "the highest possible
health status to Indians and to provide existing Indian health services with all
resources necessary to effect that policy," and to this end Congress projected
an increase in funding, using a seven-year period, for health care services
and facilities."9 The courts and commentary cite such congressional actions
in other contexts as evidence of the federal government's assumption of a
duty to provide adequate health care services to Indians.'93  In 1996,
Congress documented its finding that "unmet health needs of the American
Indian people are [still] severe and the health status of the Indians is far
below that of the general population of the United States, " " and some
commentators have concluded that despite improvements, the adequacy of
191. See DONALD L. PARMAN, INDIANS AND THE AMERICAN WEST IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 146 (1994). "Although BIA healthcare improved after 1945, it remained subpar. Only a
transfer to [Public Health Service (PHS)] seemed to offer a solution because it possessed more
resources and legislative clout . . . . Observers agree that PHS has improved Indian healthcare."
Id.; see also GETCHES, supra note 10, at 17-18.
In all, the IHS has fulfilled its charter at least as well as any federal agency
serving Indians. But . . . IHS budget appropriations have not kept pace with
inflationary health care costs and its service population has doubled in 20 years
.... Many non-Indian doctors continue to see the reservations as unattractive
assignments .... IHS hospitals are chronically understaffed.
Id. (citing LynDee Wells-Stevens, Comment, Health Care for Indigent American Indians, 20 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1105 (1988)); see also Pfefferbaum, Providing for the Health Care Needs, supra note 31,
at 217; Joe, supra note 35, at 150 ("Historically, federal government funding has not been adequate
and has failed repeatedly to keep up with the health care needs of the Indian population.").
192. See Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976)
(noting goal of increased Indian participation in management and health care choices).
193. See, e.g., White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 581 F.2d 697 (8th
Cir. 1978) (recognizing a federal, rather than state, responsibility to provide mental health care
services to indigent members of Oglala Sioux Tribe); see also Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 31 at
220.
194. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West 1999) (as amended by the Indian Health Care Improvements
Technical Corrections Act of 1996); see also President's FY 2000 Budget Request for the Indian
Health Service, Hearing Before the Interior Appropriations Subcommittee of the House
Appropriations Committee, (Mar. 23, 1999) (noting that there are "3 times as many physicians
providing health care to the average American citizen than for an American Indian or Alaskan
native").
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Indian health care is chronically threatened by political tensions and "budget
constraints at all levels of government." 95 The modem history of federal
medical services for tribes supports a conclusion that Congress has
recognized a very strong interest in meeting the health care needs of the
tribes, even if it has difficulty in appropriating the necessary operating funds
to accomplish the goal. Ironically, under the FTCA, the existence of a clear
duty sounding in federal statutory law, cannot, standing alone, serve as the
basis for an individual's tort claim. 9 6  From the standpoint of standard
Conflict of Laws methodology, however, the recognition of the federal
interest and the absence of express congressional restrictions on choice of
tribal law under the FTCA, are factors which support application of tribal
law to the issue of damages for negligent care. This application represents
an unusual but not illogical use of government interest analysis. 197
On a more troubling analytical note, in reviewing the court's pre-trial
decision about choice-of-law in the Cheromiah case, there seems to be a
suggestion that the court was influenced by assumptions about, or perhaps
non-trial evidence of, repetitive Indian Health Service malpractice issues at
ACL Hospital. 98 It is apparent that while some of the medical staff at ACL
Hospital were full-time employees, others, including doctors, were part-time
employees commuting a considerable distance from Albuquerque where they
had a primary practice.' 99 In both Louis and Cheromiah, the allegations
195. Pfefferbaum, Providing for the Health Care Needs, supra note 31, at 214.
196. See id. at 210 (citing Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427
F.2d 1194, 1198 (Ct. Cl. 1970)); see also Bear Medicine v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 1172 (D.
Mont. 1999); cf. Florida Auto Auction of Orlando, Inc. v. United States, 74 F.3d 498, 502 (4th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that federal government can be liable in two circumstances, (1) if the
alleged breach of duty is tortuous under state law, or (2) if the government breaches a duty imposed
by federal law that is similar or analogous to a duty imposed by state law) with Love v. United
States, 60 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1995) (reciting the general rule, that a breach of duty created by
a federal law, standing alone, is not actionable under the FTCA).
197. Of course, one other possibility exists. The "unique" federal/tribe relationship could be
viewed as analogous to the relationship between the United States and its military members, thus
leading to a judicially crafted theory of continuing federal immunity from related tort claims. This
is the Feres Doctrine. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); supra note 94 and text
accompanying; see also Phillip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1154 (1990).
198. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (D.N.M. 1999) ("The Court
and the parties are well aware that this is not the only wrongful death action against ACL Hospital
currently pending in this district. Malpractice by the major medical provider to the Tribe has a
significant impact. .. ").
199. See, e.g., Carmona v. Acoma Pueblo Tribal Court, No. 97-CV-06, slip opinion (Tribal
Council of the Acoma Pueblo, Mar. 21, 1998) (noting history of the Louis pregnancy including
telephone calls made by hospital to treating doctor at her office in Albuquerque regarding mother's
emergency room visits at ACL Hospital). There does not appear to have been a serious issue about
the coverage of the treating health care providers at ACL Hospital under the FTCA. For example,
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suggested a willingness to send the patients home with palliative care, rather
than to call the specialists necessary to provide accurate diagnosis and
treatment. Admittedly, there has been criticism of modem choice-of-law
doctrines; critics have pointed to weakly supported assumptions made about
the respective governments' interests at stake, and the tendency of courts to
use choice-of-law opportunities to reach their preferred, often pro-plaintiff
result.2°  Assumptions made about a specific pattern of malpractice,
however, seem to go one step beyond even the usual concerns about bias in
the use of interest analysis.2° ' When a court's decision to apply tribal law is
influenced by the allegations or existence of fault in the specific case or other
cases involving the specific hospital, the decision may reflect an
inappropriate use of the doctrine of "interest analysis."
c. Changing the Context: The Closer Balance
The previous discussion of interest analysis focuses on damages arising
from medical malpractice, asking first, whether there is any state interest
served in application of the state medical malpractice damage cap to federal
malpractice occurring within the boundaries of the tribe. The answer may
change, however, if the choice-of-law issue changes. For example, if the
question was not damages but standard of care, the respective government
interests may be different, and the weighing process may prove to be more
challenging. Assume, for example, that tribal law adopted a standard
making all doctors strictly liable for "failure to cure," rather than the
predominating state standard which predicates liability on failure to use the
the reported decisions do not address whether the health care providers were "contractors" falling
outside the scope of FTCA liability. See, e.g., Robb v. United States, 80 F.3d 884, 893-94 (4th
Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between physician as employee and independent contractor); Carillo v.
United States, 5 F.3d 1302, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that contract physician was not
employee of the United States for FTCA purposes); Bernie v. United States, 712 F.2d 1271, 1273-
74 (8th Cir. 1983) (concluding that physicians who were not directly supervised by IHS and who
were employees of independent contractors holding service contracts with the government were not
covered by the FTCA).
200. See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 226 ("The new systems do indeed
focus concern-openly-on the policy-making role of judges."); Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis
and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980) (criticizing interest analysis as
reasoning from a priori assumptions); Friedrick K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest
Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1984); see also Shapiro, supra note 101; text accompanying supra
notes 107-09.
201. See, e.g., Dirk H. Bliesener, supra note 107, at 687 (criticizing use of "fairness" as a
rationalization for permitting a particular bias to guide choice-of-law); see also United States v.
Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958) (reversing trial judge's award of damages as excessive,
criticizing personal interests expressed by judge.) "Feelings of charity or ideological sympathy for
the Indians must be put to one side." Id. at 926.
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knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of
the general medical profession or the specialty advertised. 2°2 Assume that
each of the defendant doctors involved was licensed by the state, and
employed with the federal government for part-time care at an Indian Health
Service hospital on tribal lands. While the tribal interest continues to appear
quite strong, by changing the standards of care that must be possessed and
exercised by the doctors, and not merely affecting the federal government's
liability for a dollar limitation on damages, it can be argued that the doctors
and therefore the state as a licensing and regulating authority of these same
doctors may have a more easily identifiable interest in the application of state
law to the case. 3
Similarly, the decision on choice-of-law using interest analysis principles
may be different if the issue is damages to a non-Indian plaintiff, injured by
the federal actor within Indian country, in an accident that has no particular
connection to tribal sovereignty issues, such as the "auto-accident" case
hypothesized above.' The tribal interest seems to be relatively minimal in
such a case.
Perhaps the hardest "interest analysis" cases are those in which the injury
occurs at the hands of a federal employee in Indian country, the victim is a
member of "a" tribe or even "the" tribe, but the tort involves the more
"routine" accident, such as an auto accident or the slip and fall occurring on
a negligently patched parking lot at the hospital.2 5 Regardless of whether
the issue is damages or standard of care, there is a relatively strong tribal
interest in the outcome of any case arising in Indian country and involving
tribal members.
In light of the federal Indian law history and its specialized approach to
interest analysis, it seems possible that in some instances of FTCA claims
arising within Indian country, state law will still be applied, particularly
202. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 72, at 186-87.
203. See, e.g., Elizabeth Keest Sedrel, Doctor Exodus Feared, ALBUQUERQUE J., at Al (Apr.
18, 1999).
Some physicians say rules and low pay make New Mexico a hard
place to practice.
At the beginning of the year, [the New Mexico Medical Society]
estimated that as many as 27 doctors were leaving a month. [Tihat number
includes residents, Indian Health Service physicians and physicians associated
with the military ....
Id. As long as the party injured within Indian Country is a member of the local tribe, the state's
interest in the outcome of the medical standard of care issue still seems relatively low, as compared
to the tribal interest.
204. See supra notes 145-47 and text accompanying.
205. See supra note 79 and text accompanying.
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where the "victim" is a non-Indian. It seems inevitable that in the absence of
either a "false conflict" or a black letter rule mandating application of tribal
law, some case-by-case determinations will continue to be necessary to
determine the particularized "fairness" of applying tribal law, using either
interest analysis under standard Conflict of Laws, or the more specialized
federal law about Indians as described in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Montana2°6 and Strate.207
To conclude this discussion of interest analysis and to return once again to
the Cheromiah case fact pattern, implicit in Judge Vdsquez' ruling, and
perhaps in the ruling of any court which uses interest analysis in choice-of-
law decisions on substantive issues of health care, is the unstated belief that
legal standards used to impose liability for past mistakes can be expected to
affect the quality of future health care. 2°  From the standpoint of modem
choice-of-law analysis, in at least one category of Indian country issues-the
federal government's scope of liability for damages arising from medical
malpractice-the tribe has the dominant government interest. If there are
two potential sources of the "law of the place," state and tribal law, the
Cheromiah case provides a persuasive context for recognition of tribal law.
B. A Cautionary Note: Is There a Defined Conflict to Resolve?
If, as discussed above,' tribal law is not prohibited by the phrase "law of
the place where the act or omission occurred,"20 and if as covered above, 1
there are factors establishing tribal law as highly relevant to the issue, and if
application of tribal law in the particular fact pattern comports with the
Supreme Court's concerns about adjudicatory or regulatory authority, 2 2 as
Judge Vdsquez concluded about the medical malpractice claims in Cheromiah
v. United States, 213 is there any further reason to decline to apply tribal law
under the Federal Tort Claims Act? One potential concern is determining the
existence and scope of tribal law on the issue in question. Without clearly
defined alternative law, modern Conflicts doctrine suggests that it is
206. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
207. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
208. See Franklin D. Cleckley & Govind Hariharan, A Free Market Analysis of the Effects of
Medical Malpractice Damage Cap Statutes: Can We Afford to Live with Inefficient Doctors?, 94
W.VA. L. REV. 11 (1991).
209. See supra section III.A.1.
210. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
211. See supra section III.A.2.
212. See supra section III.A.3.
213. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999).
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permissible for courts to decline to engage in a choice-of-law analysis,
instead applying "forum law," which in the context of the FTCA is probably
state law. 2 4 Further, in modem Conflicts, one factor affecting choice-of-law
is the relative "ease" of determining the law to be applied.21 5 A closer look
at the federal court's attempt to use Acoma Pueblo tribal law in Cheromiah
discloses some of the potential problems for applying tribal law under the
FTCA.
In Cheromiah, the choice-of-law determination was raised by the
plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and their assertion that tribal
law should apply to the issue of scope of recoverable damages for wrongful
death.2" 6 The plaintiffs argued,"'1 and the district court appeared to assume,
that tribal law on damages was clear, and that any attempt to impose the New
Mexico cap on damages for medical malpractice claims presented a clear
conflict of laws.21 8 This basic assumption appears open to challenge.
The plaintiffs urged the federal district court in Cheromiah to follow a
tribal court decision in Louis v. United States.2 9  The full history of the
Louis dispute raises concerns about the usefulness of this particular tribal
court opinion as precedent. In 1994, pregnant Michelle Louis, a member of
the Acoma Pueblo, was treated at the ACL Hospital. On November 13,
1994, Louis went into labor and her baby was born but died a few days after
birth, of an infection.20 She initially brought suit for wrongful death under
the FTCA in federal district court in New Mexico, alleging negligent failure
to provide critical care in the hours before the birth, but this case was
dismissed by the plaintiffs without prejudice, in order to file suits against the
treating doctor and the United States in Acoma tribal court.221 When the
214. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 164 ("[W]hat should a court do when the
parties fail to argue [or prove] foreign law, even though it appears relevant?... [Slome courts will
presume that forum law and foreign law are the same.").
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
216. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999) (on file with author).
217. See id. at 24.
218. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1309. "Judge Stoof of the Acoma Tribal Court has
already held that the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Cap 'is repugnant to the traditions and
customs of the Pueblo to adequately compensate injured parties.'" Id. (citing Louis v. United
States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D.N.M. 1999)).
219. Louis v. United States, Case No. 97-CV-24, slip op. (Tribal Court of Acoma Pueblo,
1997).
220. See Carmona v. Acoma Pueblo Tribal Court, No. 97-CV-06, slip op. (Tribal Council of
the Acoma Pueblo) (Mar. 21, 1998); Louis v. United States, Case No. 97-CV-24, slip op. (Tribal
Court of Acoma Pueblo, 1995); see also Louis v. United States, 967 F. Supp. 456, 457 (D.N.M.
1997).
221. See Louis, 967 F. Supp. at 457.
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federal government refused to appear or answer the tribal court summons,
the tribal court took evidence from the plaintiff and issued a written opinion
and order, noting the default of the United States and holding the federal
government liable for two million dollars in damages. 2 It was this opinion
on which Judge Visquez relied in recognizing the law of the Acoma tribe for
damages in medical malpractice claims.'
The Louis plaintiffs sought a declaratory ruling in federal court in an
attempt to enforce the tribal court judgment. 2m The federal suit was
dismissed, the court found that any suit against the United States for
negligence was controlled by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and therefore the
suit could be maintained only in federal district court.22 Thus, the federal
court ruled that the tribal court decision was rendered without jurisdiction
over the claim and was unenforceable. 6
Further, although not appearing before the tribal court in the tort cases,
the United States presented applications to the Acoma Tribal Council for
relief from the tribal court judgment. 7  The Acoma Tribal Council
222. See id.; Louis v. United States, Case No. 97-CV-24, slip op. (Tribal Court of Acoma
Pueblo, 1997).
223. See Cheromiah, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1309. In determining its authority to award damages,
based on a theory of concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts, the Acoma tribal court judge, in
a section of his opinion entitled "Damages: Tribal Custom and Tradition," wrote:
This court rejects New Mexico Law insofar as it attempts to limit recovery in
medical malpractice cases. Such a policy is repugnant to the traditions and
customs of the Pueblo to adequately compensate injured parties .... Although
the State Tort Claims Act places a cap on damages of $600,000.00, this court
will not adopt such restrictions as a matter of full faith and credit or comity,
since such a limitation would impermissibly infringe on the Acoma Tribal
Court's ability to adequately compensate injured parties. Such a limitation
could result in an unconstitutional deprivation of monetary damages under
Acoma Pueblo's public policy to fully compensate.
Louis v. United States, Case No. 97-CV-24, slip op. at 14-15 (Tribal Court of Acoma Pueblo,
1997).
224. See Louis, 967 F. Supp. at 456-57.
225. See id. at 458 (noting "the FTCA clearly contemplates jurisdiction over such disputes
only in federal district courts").
226. See id. The plaintiffs reopened their original federal court suit under the Tort Claims
Act, eventually leading Judge Bruce Black of the United States District Court to issue his ruling that
tribal law would not be applied under the FTCA, an analysis which Judge VWsquez expressly
rejected. See Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1306 (D.N.M. 1999) (rejecting
Louis v. United States, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1210 (D.N.M.1999) ("Plaintiff's conclusion that
Acoma law is the applicable law in this case is based on a [sic] incorrect interpretation of New
Mexico law.")
227. See Carmona v. Acoma Pueblo Tribal Court, No. 97-CV-06, slip op. (Acoma Tribal
Council, Mar. 21, 1998). Both the plaintiff and the treating doctor were represented by attorneys
"who are active members of the New Mexico State Bar and the Acoma Pueblo Tribal Bar," and the
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recognized the pendency of the related action in federal court, and "stayed"
its own tribal court's ruling, conceding that if the doctor was acting in the
scope of her employment with the federal government during the alleged
negligence, a matter to be determined in the federal court, the federal district
court would have exclusive jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act.22
The Acoma Tribal Council appeared to reject the tribal court's position that
it had "concurrent" jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a
decision that is entirely consistent with the plain language of the Act.229 The
Council concluded:
If the Tribal Council were to only look to legal technicalities, the
unchallenged default judgment against the United States could
prohibit Ms. Louis from suing Dr. Carmona in tribal court. Under
the circumstances of this case, however, that would not be doing
justice to the lack of any consideration of facts going to the heart of
this issue by the tribal court. The failure of the tribal court to
explicitly address the sovereign immunity of the United States
before entering the default judgment was an abuse of discretion. If
sovereign immunity exists, then there is no power, subject matter
jurisdiction, to enter a judgment against the sovereign. A default
judgment entered by a court that does not have the power to do so
is void. 230
Referring to the tribal court decision, the Acoma Tribal Council described
the default ruling as "clear legal error.""1 To summarize this history, by the
standards of the Acoma Tribal Council, the default-based ruling of its tribal
court in the Louis case should not be treated as Acoma tribe precedent.
In fact, the Pueblo of Acoma went further, appearing as amicus curiae
and presenting a motion to the federal district court in Cheromiah in response
to Judge Vdsquez' ruling that tribal law would be applied to the FTCA
doctor's counsel "requested the Tribal Council to issue a writ of prohibition or a writ of supervisory
control to prevent the Acoma Pueblo Tribal Court" from hearing the Louis tort case. Id. at 2.
228. See id. at 4.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See id. In addressing the authority of its tribal court on the Louis case, the Acoma Tribal
Council supplied commentary on tribal law, in the nature of what most federal and state courts
would describe as dicta. The tribal council noted,
Generally, the tribal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a common law
medical negligence claim arising from the practice of medicine on the Pueblo.
Acoma Pueblo Tribal Court is a general jurisdiction court. Absent an explicit
prohibition in tribal law, it can hear common law claims. . . . There is no
prohibition in the tribal law related to common law medical negligence (or
other personal injury) claims.
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claim. The Pueblo sought leave to advise the court on Acoma law, and
expressed the Tribal Council's concern that the court was relying on
"questionable precedent."232 Attached to the motion was a resolution of the
Tribal Council, describing a "process for responding to requests for
unwritten tribal law," which appears 'to be analogous to a process for
certification of questions between state and federal courts.
Because the Cheromiah case settled, the federal district court did not have
an opportunity to announce a further decision on application of tribal law in
light of the more complete picture on tribal law. Interestingly, in apparent
recognition of the potential for the state or federal court to apply tribal law,
in December of 1997, the Acoma Pueblo began considering proposed
legislation to amend its written code, to provide specific wrongful death
remedies and to address damages arising from medical malpractice.234
The Cheromiah case experience demonstrates both the potential problems
and the potential solutions for determination of tribal law. Tribal law differs
from tribe to tribe, running the gamut from the detailed code and written
decisions of the Navajo Nation, to tribes which operate entirely by customary
law. 5 The potential for difficulty in "proving" the law of the place,
however, is not unique to tribal law,236 and the topic has been addressed by
the courts under the Federal Tort Claims Act, both with respect to the law of
states and territories. 37 As one court has observed, where available, a
232. See Motion for Leave to File Notice with Court as Amicus Curiae on Pueblo of Acoma
Law Pertaining to Torts, Cheromiah v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999) (on file
with author).
233. Resolution No. TC-Jul-28-99-3 of the Pueblo of Acoma (July 28, 1999) (on file with
author). The resolution noted that although the United States District Court had determined that it
should apply Acoma Law in the medical malpractice lawsuit, "[tlhere is no written law of the
Pueblo addressing these types of cases." Id. at 1. Of specific concern to the Pueblo was the
prospect that the parties would present "expert witnesses" in an attempt to provide Acoma
traditional law, rather than consult with the tribe through official channels, a prospect that could
"create division within the Pueblo and should be avoided." Id. at 1-2.
234. See Rodgers Interview, supra 132. According to Ms. Rodgers, the Acoma Tribal Code
has undergone two major revisions since the 1970s issue, in 1985 and again in 1995; see also supra
note 132 and text accompanying. In addition, the tribal court systems vary from tribe to tribe. See
John Gibeaut, Courting Trouble, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 68 (reporting that "262 of the 560
federally recognized tribes have court systems" ranging from the simple to the complex).
235. See Newton, supra note 131; Pommersheim, supra note 152; see also Gloria Valencia-
Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225 (1994).
236. See generally Alexander, supra note 117.
237. See Red Elk v. United States, 62 F.3d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1995) (observing that "each
party has the same problem in finding adequate support in South Dakota law. That problem is now
ours."); Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1033 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying California law in the
absence of Guam law); see also Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 1986) (using
Texas' certification procedure for sending to the Texas Supreme Court the question of whether
Texas statutory cap on medical malpractice damages was unconstitutional under Texas law);
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state's process for certification of questions about substantive state law
should be followed. "To further the salutary goal of leaving the development
of a state's law to its own courts in the first instance, at least 24 states have
adopted procedures by which a federal court can certify controlling questions
of law to the state's supreme court." 23  The Acoma tribe's offer to respond
to a formal inquiry is similar to state certification procedures. Previously,
proof of a foreign "country's" law was treated as a question of fact routinely
involving witness testimony. Currently Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1
provides a process for taking judicial notice, making the determination an
issue of law which may be reviewed on appeal. 2 9
The tribe seems more likely than any state or territory to recognize and
assert a specific interest in the outcome of the choice-of-law process under
the FTCA. As adopted in the non-FTCA context, the Supreme Court's
exhaustion and deferral doctrines, and its willingness to reject certain
attempts by states to exercise judicial jurisdiction, are an attempt to protect
Indian tribal sovereignty rights.2' Utilization of a tribe's certification
process in the FTCA context appears to respond to these same concerns, by
providing the tribal authority with the first opportunity to be heard on
substantive issues affecting Indian country and essential interests of tribal
members .24
Where there is a question raised about tribal law in a Federal Tort Claims
Act case, several options appear to exist: (1) in the absence of clear tribal
consensus on the nature and scope of tribal law, the federal district court
could apply "state law" as the default law, applicable to persons who are
Flannery v. United States, 649 F.2d 270, 273 (4th Cir. 1981) (certifying questions related to
damages to West Virginia Supreme Court under state statutory process).
238. Piligian v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1 (D. Mass. 1986) ("It is the nature of
our federal system that federal courts often are called upon to declare and apply the law of a distant
state, even though the federal court cannot lay claim to any particular insight into that state's
laws. ").
239. See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. It provides in pertinent part: "The court, in determining
foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not
submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law." Id.
240. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); National Farmers Union Ins. v.
Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); see also discussion
supra part III.A.2.b.
241. Conceding that the exhaustion doctrine of Iowa Mutual is not applicable to FTCA claims,
one prominent tribal court official has urged federal courts to consider certification of questions of
tribal law to the tribal court where tribal law is an issue under the FTCA, noting the long term
benefits of such communication for Indian/federal relations. See B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal
Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Relations,
24 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 457, 508-509 (1998).
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members both of the tribe and the state; 2 or (2) the court could "predict"
tribal law, perhaps making it necessary for the court to modify the traditional
American jurisprudential definitions of precedent, and to recognize the
Indian traditions of customary law and other less "formal" sources of tribal
law; or (3) the court could look for procedures within the tribe permitting
certification of questions of substantive tribal law to the highest tribal
authority.2 3 The last alternative, while potentially time consuming, would
appear to be the best way to give appropriate recognition to the tribe's
significant government interest in the outcome of certain issues.
C. Refining the Choice-of-Law Analysis and Looking to the Future
When the federal tortfeasor's negligent act or omission occurs within
tribal boundaries, when the injured claimant is Indian, and when tribal law
has a "significant connection" to the legal issue at hand, such as damages for
medical malpractice, it appears analytically sound from the standpoint of
traditional doctrine on Conflict of Laws to apply tribal law under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Similarly, the application of tribal law in this instance
appears to serve important historical concerns, expressed by the Supreme
Court in its articulation of federal law about Indians, particularly the concern
for deference to tribal authority.2' Just as state and federal courts are called
upon to apply nonforum law in the cross-state or international arenas, the
242. On difficult questions of proof of foreign law, such as may be involved when looking to
the law of foreign countries, commentators discuss two approaches: "First, some courts will
presume that forum law and foreign law are the same. . . .[But a] better escape device is to treat
the parties' failure to prove foreign law as showing their acquiescence in having forum law
applied." RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 164-65.
243. Difficulties are inherent in the process of looking to law outside the court's usual frame
of reference, and it seems important to recognize that tribal law is probably neither more nor less
likely to involve problems of proof than would be true of the law of a foreign country. As one
commentary notes in discussing the important option of certification of questions about foreign law:
Difficult problems involving proof of foreign law arise when no controlling
precedent exists on the issue in the foreign state. A partial solution is provided
by the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. The Act permits a
federal court or a state appellate court to certify a question of law to the highest
court of another state. . . .Certification is a wonderful device for getting
foreign law interpreted correctly. It may cost time and money and result in
quasi-advisory opinions divorced from the discipline imposed by the real facts
of an actual case; nevertheless, certification helps to achieve uniformity and
should be used more often.
Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
244. See discussion supra part III.A.2.b.
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federal court's decision to apply tribal law should be viewed as consistent
with mainstream approaches in Conflict of Laws.S
The decision of the federal court to apply tribal law, however, is not
without potentially negative effects on tribal sovereignty. The federal court
will, in the first instance, decide whether there is a conflict between state and
tribal law, and, just as it does with state law, the federal court has the power
to decide tribal law.2 6 The federal court may make the "wrong" decision
about tribal law, at least from the viewpoint of some members of the tribe.
The federal court's role puts a premium on tribal law that is documented in
writing, by codification or easily accessible written opinions, and in turn this
may impact a tribe's history of customary law or less formal claims
resolution processes.247 Further, the tribe's possible desire to accommodate
the interests of individual tribal members in appropriate compensation for the
torts of the federal government may conflict with the tribe's greater interest
in maintaining jurisdictional control over decisions vitally affecting the tribe
as a whole.248 At a minimum, this tension highlights the importance of the
federal court's willingness to engage in a searching inquiry for controlling
tribal law, particularly the use of a certification process for direct inquiry to
the tribe.
In Cheromiah v. United States,249 the federal district court's initial
misunderstanding of the precedential value of the tribal court decision in the
Louis v. United States250 malpractice case was probably created by the
parties, or rather, the parties' counsel. Plaintiffs counsel most likely
believed she had a well-tailored opinion relevant to the issues of Acoma
tribal law on wrongful death as a cause of action, and on whether there
would be a cap recognized for total damages arising from medical
malpractice. The federal government, believing tribal law was not a
possibility, had little incentive to approach the tribal council for a more
definitive statement of law. Historically, the courts have depended on the
245. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 249-67 (discussing wide range of frequent
choice-of-law problems).
246. See text accompanying supra notes 223-300.
247. See supra notes 76-77 and text accompanying.
248. See supra notes 76-77 and text accompanying. The tension between individual claims
and tribal sovereignty pervades modem Indian law. As one commentary notes: "[R]ecognition of
Native American sovereignty presents a conundrum: Can that sovereignty be fully respected except
at the expense of individual rights? Can the power of Native American tribes, acting as
governments, expand without a concomitant contraction of the rights of Native American men and
women?" Drew S. Days, Forward to PETRA T. SHATTUCK & JILL NORGEN, PARTIAL JUSTICE:
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM at xi (1991).
249. 55 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (D.N.M. 1999).
250. Case No. 97-CV-24, slip. op. (Tribal Court of Acoma Pueblo, 1997).
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parties for proof of foreign law.2' In the case of tribal law, especially given
the historical overlay of recognizing the need for deference to tribal
authority, this reliance on the parties may be inadequate protection. If there
appears to be any question about the nature and scope of tribal law, the
federal court should initiate an inquiry to the tribal authority to determine
whether the tribe has taken a position on the legal issue.
A related problem is one of timing. In the Cheromiah case, the decision
to apply tribal law was made in response to motions for summary judgment,
and was made just a few weeks before the scheduled trial date. As a
practical matter, it is probably much harder for a judge to take the time
necessary to resolve a close question of tribal law through the certification
process, when the issues are identified late in the litigation. Again, this puts
a burden on the court to recognize the potential for tribal law to apply, and to
do so at the earliest possible point in the federal litigation. One of the long-
standing complaints about government interest analysis as a Conflict of Laws
doctrine is the possibility that courts are guessing about policies underlying
the different state laws, or worse, are making outcome determinative
assumptions about relative governmental interests.52 In the instance of tribal
law, however, the tribe is likely to have centuries of reasons for distrust of
"federal" decisions affecting their members, thus increasing the importance
of getting it right.
Finally, as with all Conflict of Laws questions, the search for a fair
mechanism for decisions on choice-of-law may lead to seemingly
unpredictable or inconsistent results, based on even slight changes in fact.
Because of the FTCA's focus on law of the "place" where the negligent act
or omission occurs, 3 in many situations affecting Indian interests, tribal law
will not be an option. Many Indian Health Service facilities are located not
within specific tribal boundaries, but rather in centralized urban areas.
5 4
While tribes served by such federal health centers have just as great an
interest in the outcome of health care decisions, the absence of the tribal
"place" to trigger the choice-of-law process will deny parties or tribes the
opportunity to make an effective argument about tribal law. Undoubtedly, as
new fact patterns emerge for consideration of tribal law under the FTCA, the
viability of the Cheromiah analysis will be tested.
251. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 46, at 163-66; see also notes 227-29 and text
accompanying.
252. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
253. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
254. See GETCHES, supra note 10, at 18 (noting "Urban Indians are eligible for only limited
health services . . .").
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the federal government with
several safeguards against irrational outcomes arising from the application of
the law of any "place. "5' Because the suits are tried without a jury and only
in federal district courts, the specter of run-away local juries is missing."
Punitive or exemplary damages are specifically prohibited.5 7 Where the
issue is scope of damages, the absence of a cap on medical malpractice
damages does not mean that the trial court must award "more" damages.
The absence of a cap merely permits the court to consider whether a full and
fair measure of damages for injuries occurring on tribal lands requires an
award greater than the levels determined by state legislatures.
Finally, there seems to be little realistic reason for concern that a tribe
can effectively "target" federal employees by adopting legislation subjecting
them to greater damages or stricter standards of conduct. The FTCA permits
liability to be imposed on the federal government only when the "private
person" would be liable to the claimant in accordance with law of the
"place.""8 There is also a practical restraint, particularly in the area of
medical services. Any tribe that departs dramatically from the standards of
the surrounding state or states may find itself without private care doctors or
medical care insurers for private practitioners.
In the area of medical malpractice involving federal hospitals in Indian
country providing services to tribal members, the decision in Cheromiah
offers new insight into the appropriate use of tribal law as the more
significant law of the "place" where the negligent acts or omissions
occurred. The most difficult step, departing from the "usual" approach, has
been taken. Where the journey will lead would appear to depend on whether
there exists clearly articulated tribal law in circumstances where private
parties would also be subject to liability-or possibly, whether Congress acts
to redefine the scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
255. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
257. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
258. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 1999) (limiting causes of action for tort to
"circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant").
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